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Invisible Prisons
M. Eve Hanan*
Modern punishment theory is based on an inadequate conceptualization
of the severity of incarceration. While the severity of a prison sentence is
measured solely in terms of the length of time, the actual experience of
imprisonment is often more punishing and more destructive than a simple
loss of liberty. Yet, lawmakers and judges evince a surprising lack of
institutional interest in understanding the experience of imprisonment and
applying this knowledge to sentencing. This lack of official attention to how
prison is experienced by incarcerated people is one of the drivers of mass
incarceration.
This Article is the first scholarly work to analyze the weaknesses of
punishment theory using a new and flourishing branch of political
philosophy: epistemic injustice theory. The theory posits that disfavored
social groups are excluded from contributing information about their
experience that should be relevant to policy decisions. Epistemic injustice
theory can be applied to analyze why incarcerated people’s accounts of
prison’s cruelties are ignored or discounted in punishment decisions. As a
disfavored group, prisoner accounts of prison’s harshness are discredited.
As a result, sentencing decisions are made with only the thinnest
understanding of the punishment being imposed — number of years of lost
liberty — and with no accounting for the actual impact of incarceration on
the person sentenced.

* Copyright © 2020 M. Eve Hanan. Associate Professor, University of Nevada Las
Vegas, Boyd School of Law, J.D. University of Michigan Law School. I thank Monica
Bell, Erin Braatz, Erin Collins, Malcolm Feeley, Thomas Frampton, RaShya Ghee,
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Walker Sterling, Fred Van Dyk and the organizers of conferences at which I presented
this Article, including, the Law and Society Association’s annual conference, NYU Law
School’s Clinical Writer’s Program, LatCrit, CrimFest, the University of Colorado Junior
Scholars Forum, and the AALS Clinical Conference. I offer special thanks to Elizabeth
Manriquez for her exceptional skills as a research librarian locating hard-to-find
sources.
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Applying the framework of epistemic injustice to explore the thinness of
punishment theory serves more than a descriptive function. It also forms the
basis for concrete recommendations to improve sentencing policy and
practice. To this end, the Article suggests (1) how sentencing authorities
can exercise epistemic responsibility in punishment decisions; (2) how
incarcerated people can participate in knowledge-creation; and (3) how the
problem of variability of prison conditions can be accounted for in
sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
Life inside U.S. prisons is both the object of public fascination and
invisible in sentencing policy. On the one hand, popular culture
demonstrates an obsession with prison stories.1 Whether fancifully,
such as television shows set in prison,2 or seriously, such as journalistic
reports of prison conditions,3 impressions of what prison is like are
available at our digital fingertips. Beyond what is easily digestible in
video, podcast,4 and blog5 format, are decades of social science studies

1

See CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 6 (2009).
See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 18 (2003) (remarking upon the
widespread belief that we think we know what prison is like because of depictions of
prison in television shows like Oz). Netflix claimed that over one hundred million
viewers have tuned in to watch Orange is the New Black, a television series based on
Piper Kerman’s memoir of her incarceration in federal prison. Ron Lyons, Jr., Netflix
Says 105 Million Subscribers Have Watched an Episode of Orange Is the New Black, SLATE
(July 19, 2019, 6:33 AM), https://slate.com/culture/2019/07/orange-is-the-new-blacknetflix-105-million-viewers.html [https://perma.cc/W73V-9RX3].
3 For example, The New York Times’ two-part series on an Alabama prison, which
drew on diverse sources such as photographs and prisoner letters. ‘No One Feels Safe
Here’: Life in Alabama’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/29/us/alabama-prison-inmates.html [https://perma.cc/KZ87-4W62].
4 For example, EAR HUSTLE, https://www.earhustlesq.com (last visited Dec. 13,
2020) [https://perma.cc/MF54-JRZ9], a podcast made by prisoners in San Quentin
Correctional Facility, California.
5 See, for example, Byron Case, The Pariah’s Syntax: Unbound Notes from an Innocent
Man, PARIAH BLOG, http://www.pariahblog.com (last visited Dec. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Z3BE-6QUY] (describing life inside of maximum-security prison);
INMATE BLOGGER, https://inmateblogger.com (last visited Dec. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3RXR-FHDG], a web platform where incarcerated men and women blog
about their experiences; PRISON WRITERS, http://prisonwriters.com (last visited Dec. 13,
2020) [https://perma.cc/H6AY-9AAR], a web platform showcasing the writing of
incarcerated people.
2
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on prison life.6 Moreover, prisoner memoirs,7 poetry,8 and newspapers,9
provide direct sources of prisoner perspectives on their experiences of
incarceration. Some formerly incarcerated people practice as
attorneys,10 and serve as our academic colleagues in law11 and
criminology.12 In short, it is possible to immerse oneself in information
about what it is like to be in prison and thereby achieve some
understanding, however imperfect, of what I will call prison-asexperienced.

6 For a summary of twentieth century studies of prison life, see, for example, Lori
Sexton, Penal Subjectivities: Developing a Theoretical Framework for Penal Consciousness,
17 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 114, 116-118 (2015) (reviewing literature regarding prison
studies conducted in the twentieth century). Sexton’s article also promulgates a new
framework for how prisoners understand their punishment. See id. at 128-31.
7 See, e.g., JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST (1981) (describing
incarceration in a series of letters to Norman Mailer); WILBERT RIDEAU, IN THE PLACE OF
JUSTICE: A STORY OF PUNISHMENT AND DELIVERANCE (2010) (describing the author’s
experience serving a life sentence at Louisiana’s “Angola” prison).
8 See, e.g., JIMMY SANTIAGO BACA, A PLACE TO STAND: THE MAKING OF A POET (2001)
(describing the author’s process of becoming a poet while incarcerated); REGINALD
DWAYNE BETTS, FELON: POEMS (2019) (detailing a formerly incarcerated poet’s
perspective through a compilation of poetry).
9 The most acclaimed prison newspaper was The Angolite, published by prisoners
in Louisiana State Penitentiary, which received numerous journalism awards. See
Stephanie Kane, An Interview with the Most Rehabilitated Prisoner in America, 39 LITIG.
16, 16 (2013) (interviewing prison journalist, Walter Rideau, about his work and
awards as the editor of The Angolite).
10 See, e.g., Innocence Staff, Exoneree Jarrett Adams Defends Kevin Bailey’s Innocence
in Chicago Court, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.innocenceproject.
org/exoneree-back-in-court-as-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/43Z3-7KHE] (profiling Jarrett
Adams, an exoneree who went on to become an attorney working with the Innocence
Project).
11 See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
faculty/shon-hopwood/ [https://perma.cc/2BSE-795Y] [hereinafter GEO. LAW]
(profiling Georgetown Law Associate Professor Shon Hopwood, whose research
includes sentencing policy and practice). See generally Shon Hopwood, Second Looks
and Second Chances, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83 (2019) (investigating ways that the criminal
justice system can reform sentences for incarcerated people based on evidence of
rehabilitation, in which the author uses his story as an example).
12 In the emerging discipline of “convict criminology,” formerly incarcerated people
in academia study criminal justice issues from an “insider perspective.” Stephen C.
Richards & Jeffrey Ian Ross, Introducing the New School of Convict Criminology, 28 SOC.
JUST. 177, 182 (2001). The Division of Convict Criminology is a loosely affiliated group
of researchers working from this perspective. DIV. OF CONVICT CRIMINOLOGY,
https://www.concrim.org/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V23G-LYC9].
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Despite variation in prison experiences, which I will say more about
later,13 there are many similarities.14 Accounts of incarcerated people
depict prison as an environment of isolation, deprivation, violence, and
the threat of violence.15 Incarcerated prison journalist Walter Rideau
described imprisonment as being “assaulted psychologically and
emotionally, [in a] way in which you are robbed of any dignity as a
human being and told in countless ways that you don’t matter.”16
Degradation results from many aspects of regulated prison life,
including the complete loss of privacy that inheres in strip searches and
open toilets and showers.17 Even relatively safe and well-resourced
prisons exercise total control over prisoners by regulating almost every
aspect of life, including food, sleep, clothing, hygiene, medical care,
daily schedule, and social contact. This total control results in total
vulnerability.18
British and U.S. prisons have been demonstrably cruel since at least the
eighteenth century, as both the author, Charles Dickens and the prison
reformer, John Howard, reported.19 And prisons remain like this. Steve
Martin, a prison reform advocate who has spent forty-six years working
in prisons, was asked in an interview, “[I]s it inevitable that prison and

13

See infra Part III.C.
See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961) (analogizing between mental hospitals and prisons
as “total institutions”); GRESHAM SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958) (comparing
carceral systems to totalitarian regimes). Both describe aspects of the carceral experience
across types of confinement and institutional settings.
15 See infra Part I.
16 RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 338.
17 See, e.g., DWAYNE BETTS, A QUESTION OF FREEDOM: A MEMOIR OF LEARNING,
SURVIVAL, AND COMING OF AGE IN PRISON 15 (2009) (describing repeated requests for a
shower and clean clothes, Betts explains, “[y]ou could beg, but that just made you feel
. . . like you weren’t in control of yourself. Worse than that, you could beg and still not
get anything”).
18 See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 912-13 (2009) [hereinafter Cruelty] (describing incarcerated
individuals’ complete vulnerability to and dependence on prison administration).
19 See JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, WITH
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND AN ACCOUNT OF SOME FOREIGN PRISONS AND HOSPITALS 515 (2d ed. 1777) (documenting violence and deprivation in eighteenth century British
prisons). Charles Dickens described his discussions with and observations of prisoners
in Philadelphia’s Eastern State Penitentiary with attention to its use of solitary
confinement. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 41 (1842)
(“I went from cell to cell that day; and every face I saw, or word I heard, or incident I
noted, is present to my mind in all its painfulness.”).
14
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confinement circumstances are gonna be awful?”20 Martin answered,
“The short answer is yes.” He went on to say that “what is rarely talked
about is how literally debilitating actual confinement is. It is so often
cruel, it’s so often brutal, it’s so often violent, and it’s always
unforgiving.”21 Borrowing from Martin, I will refer to the constellation of
prison experiences as prison’s cruelties. I mean the colloquial sense of the
word cruelty and leave its constitutional implications for another day.
While, on the one hand, fictional and factual accounts of prison life
abound, prison’s cruelties literally and figuratively do not count in
punishment decisions. As Adam Kolber aptly put it, “We fetishistically
focus on the length of prison terms, even though sentence severity
cannot just be a function of time.”22 To be clear, I am not addressing (as
Kolber does in the article I quote) how each individual defendant may
be differently impacted by prison.23 Troublingly, when judges raise
concerns over prison’s cruelties for individual defendants, it is often
when they are sentencing wealthy white defendants.24 Rather than
focusing on individual differences, I highlight the need for a deeper
understanding of prison’s cruelties both when lawmakers enact criminal
statutes and when judges think generally about what they are
sentencing defendants to.
This Article takes a novel approach to analyzing the lack of salience
that prison’s cruelties have in punishment decisions by applying a
theory based in political philosophy: epistemic injustice. Coined by
Miranda Fricker in 2007, epistemic injustice studies how subordination
of social groups leads to excluding those groups from producing and

20 Stay Tuned: Behind Barrs (with Steve Martin, Prison Reformer), CAFE (Mar. 28,
2019), https://cafe.com/stay-tuned-behind-barrs-with-steve-martin-prison-reformer/
[https://perma.cc/FX4Z-DB92].
21 Id.
22 Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 2 (2012).
23 For a thorough and intriguing discussion of considering the individual’s
subjective experience of punishment at sentencing, see Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective
Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 196-218 (2009) [hereinafter The
Subjective Experience].
24 See Mark W. Bennett, Justin D. Levinson & Koichi Hioki, Judging Federal WhiteCollar Fraud Sentencing: An Empirical Study Revealing the Need for Further Reform, 102
IOWA L. REV. 939, 947 (2017) (“White-collar defendants received ‘special empathy’
because their position in society was more like the judge’s own position.”) (quoting
Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress,
76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (2013)); Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, The
Influence of Income and Other Factors on Whether Criminal Defendants Go to Prison, 11 L.
& SOC’Y. REV. 57, 81 (1976) (finding higher income defendants are less likely to receive
prison sentence).

2020]

Invisible Prisons

1191

sharing knowledge.25 Prisoners, as an excluded and often reviled group,
are not viewed as having trustworthy and relevant information. Their
experiences of imprisonment are ignored or discounted, contributing to
the dearth of knowledge about prison-as-experienced applied in
sentencing decisions. This thin understanding of what prison is like, in
turn, fuels the sense that prison-as-experienced is irrelevant to
sentencing decisions and, therefore, not worth learning about.
Epistemic injustice provides an analytic lens for viewing the seeming
paradox of the wide availability of accounts of prison’s cruelties and
their lack of influence in sentencing policy and practice. One might
wonder whether lawmakers and judges lack information about prison’s
cruelties or simply think prison’s cruelties do not matter to their work.26
The seeming tension between the two explanations is illustrated in a
1984 Nightline interview with U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger,
who was invited to debate an incarcerated prison journalist, Walter
Rideau.27 Chief Justice Burger argued that lawmakers and judges are
unaware of prison’s cruelties, and that they should educate themselves
about what prison is really like by visiting prisons and speaking face-toface with men like Mr. Rideau. (It was not much of a debate, as Chief
Justice Burger and Mr. Rideau agreed.) Yet, was lack of information
about prison’s cruelties really the issue? Nightline’s Ted Koppel told the
Chief Justice that people were calling in to the live-cast show saying,
“To hell with those people!” While the Chief Justice and Mr. Rideau
continued to advocate for education of lawmakers, Mr. Koppel’s callers
suggested public hostility to prisoners rather than ignorance of their
plight in prison. The lack of knowledge and the lack of empathy are
mutually reinforcing, as epistemic injustice theory makes clear.
Finally, epistemic injustice theory prescribes practices for including
marginalized voices in political decisions. By including incarcerated
voices, sentencing policy and practice can take a first step toward
understanding what we do when we sentence individuals to prison.
Punishment decisions may be lawful and yet unjust from a political
perspective. As Judith Shklar argues, accurate theories of injustice

25 See MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 12, 131 (2007).
26 See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN
PUNISHMENT 218 (2014) [hereinafter INFERNO] (describing how prison narratives
illuminate how terrifying and destructive many prison experiences are, and
acknowledging the lack of interest or empathy in those narratives, even the prevalence
of sexual assault in prison).
27 See Nightline (ABC television broadcast June 19, 1984), https://tvnews.vanderbilt.
edu/broadcasts/657005 [https://perma.cc/USD8-JF3H].
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require cataloguing the harms that people experience in order to
determine which harms we consider incidental and which harms we
consider the product of injustice.28 The line between the incidental and
the unjust is a political line that we can only draw after considering the
varieties of harm people experience.
In other words, sentencing authorities should not make punishment
decisions based on the assumption that prison is a neutral space where
occasional injustice occurs. Prison is defined by its experienced
cruelties, and these cruelties must be accounted for in sentencing. No
other approach ensures that sentencing policy will be based on a
realistic assessment of the damage inflicted by incarceration. To this
end, incarcerated people must be active participants in shaping public,
collective understanding of prison’s cruelties.
Part I has descriptive and normative elements. First, I describe how
sentencing theory and practice rely on quantification to measure the
severity of punishment. I argue that prison-as-experienced is relevant
to sentencing, particularly in light of the traditional goals of punishment
and their limiting principles of parsimony and proportionality. I then
lay out the broader argument that a political understanding of any
injustices involved in the practice of incarceration cannot be adequately
understood without consideration of prison-as-experienced.
In Part II, I introduce and apply the framework of epistemic injustice
to shed light on how prison-as-experienced is overlooked, ignored, and
poorly understood precisely because incarcerated people are not viewed
as trustworthy and essential producers of knowledge. I explain how the
resultant lack of interest and knowledge about prison-as-experienced
reinforces the erroneous belief among sentencing authorities that
prison’s cruelties are not relevant to sentencing. I then make the case
for an epistemic correction: the necessity of first-hand accounts of the
prison experience to combatting both the interest and information
deficits in sentencing policy and practice.
In Part III, I discuss how lawmakers and other sentencing authorities
should approach knowing more about prison. I then address how
sentencing authorities should apply their knowledge of prison’s
cruelties to punishment decisions. Because they cannot dictate prison
conditions, sentencing authorities should make punishment decisions
assuming that the worst of prison’s cruelties may befall any person
sentenced to prison.

28 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 50 (1990) (discussing how political
theory is “ideally suited to investigate the question of how to separate injustice from
misfortune”).
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THE RELEVANCE OF PRISON’S CRUELTIES TO SENTENCING

What prison is like for incarcerated people is relevant to sentencing
policy and practice. In this Part, I briefly address some of the
generalizable themes of prison’s cruelties in order to frame the
discussion of relevance. I then critique the current method of measuring
the severity of prison sentences solely in units of time. I analyze the
relevance of prison’s cruelties to the traditional goals of and limits on
punishment. Finally, I argue that a full accounting of prison’s cruelties
is essential to the larger public debate about the carceral response to
crime.
To be sure, prison experiences are not homogeneous. People differ in
how they experience prison; prison conditions vary by prison and even
by unit within the same prison. Yet, despite variation, general themes
emerge that may fairly be considered hallmarks of imprisonment.29
Conceived of as an archipelago society of incarcerated people living
with one another, prisons and jails constitute the fourth largest city in
the United States.30 Cities may vary, but the experience of living in cities
has certain constants, as the author Italo Calvino suggests when he
writes that there is only one city in the world, broken into an
archipelago.31 The shared experiences across prisons in the archipelago
allow us to — with humility and room for correction — describe
prison’s cruelties.
First, and ever central to a discussion of U.S. prisons is violence and
the fear of violence, which should be understood as both sanctioned and
unsanctioned violence. Sanctioned violence occurs in the order to
incarcerate,32 disciplinary measures, threats of violence, and actual
29 Although prisoners do not form a monolith, sharing one experience of
incarceration, diverse voices can form a “plural subject” when expressing their
perspectives in a coordinated way. See generally Margaret Gilbert, Modelling Collective
Belief, 73 SYNTHESE 185 (1987) (theorizing that acceptance of a common experience can
define a group as much as a single belief).
30 Introduction: The American Prison Writer as Witness, in FOURTH CITY: ESSAYS FROM
THE PRISON IN AMERICA 1, 1 (Doran Larson ed., 2013).
31 See ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 128-29 (William Weaver trans., 1972). In his
fictitious account of a conversation between Kublai Khan and Marco Polo, Khan asks
Polo why he talks about the cities he visited but will not talk about his hometown. Polo
responds, “[e]very time I describe a city I am saying something about Venice.” Id. at 86.
32 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986)
(noting that “most prisoners walk into prison because they know they will be dragged
or beaten into prison if they do not walk”). To support his claim that judicial orders of
incarceration are acts of violence, Cover refers the reader to first-person narratives of
prisoners. Id. at 1608 n.19 (citing ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 128-30 (1968)); see
also JEROME WASHINGTON, A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE YARD: NOTES AND STORIES FROM A PRISON
JOURNAL 5 (1981).
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violence that prison guards may use to secure prisoners’ day-to-day
compliance.33 Unsanctioned violence is also a general feature of U.S.
prisons. A 2009 study concluded that “[p]hysical and sexual assault are
part of the prison experience,” with at least 20% of male prisoners
experiencing a physical assault during any six-month period.34
Strikingly, almost 50% of the assaults reported were committed by
guards.35 It is fair to say that, although officially forbidden, violent —
and sometimes sexual — assaults are part of the fabric of prison life, not
an exception.36 Put another way, violence in prison is a feature not a bug.
Second, even in the absence of violence, prison places the prisoner in
a state of total vulnerability.37 The incarcerated person is at the mercy
of the rules and whims of the prison administration and its staff. The
rules that tightly control prison life often seem arbitrary and arbitrarily
applied,38 provoking “a sense of madness and superfluous cruelty.”39 In
addition, access to basic physical and psychological necessities,
including food, medical and mental health care, and hygiene products
may be limited or sporadically available.40
Third, the isolation of prison life is often experienced as banishment,
permanent exclusion, and civic death.41 This sense of banishment and
33 Violence as an expected instrument of prison guards is nothing new. In the early
nineteenth century at the Quaker-conceived Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia
and New York’s Auburn Prison, disobedient prisoners were bound in metal restraints,
beaten with a barbed whip, and held in solitary. SMITH, supra note 1, at 44.
34 Nancy Wolff & Jing Shi, Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male
Prisons: Incidents and Their Aftermath, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 58, 58 (2009).
35 See RAMONA R. RANTALA, JESSICA REXROAT & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU JUST. STAT. U.S.
DEP’T JUST., SURVEY OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2009–11 STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ssvacf0911st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DX4P-N6SQ].
36 See, e.g., RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 155 (explaining that complicit security offenders
condone and maintain the existence of sexual violence, an integral part of life in prison).
37 Dolovich, Cruelty, supra note 18, at 913.
38 See RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 338 (describing prison life as “endless aggravation”
at the stupidity of administration and “unparalleled boredom”).
39 Id. at 164.
40 See Lori Sexton, Under the Penal Gaze: An Empirical Examination of Penal
Consciousness Among Prison Inmates 44-45 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Irvine) (for the U.S. Department of Justice),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239671.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM49-TDHE]
[hereinafter Under the Penal Gaze]. Part of the punishment as experienced, for example,
is not only having a medical ailment, but realizing that the prison officials will not
arrange medical treatment. See id. at 45-46.
41 Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 97 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2012) (“[T]he American carceral system, once to some extent at least rhetorically
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death may be exacerbated by separation from family and community.42
Testifying before a Congressional Committee, Piper Kerman showed a
scene from Orange is the New Black in which an incarcerated woman
who had just given birth was returned to prison without her child.43
One Congressman viewing the scene described it as “heart
wrenching.”44 This “agony of separation” from family has been
described by many prisoners, including Nelson Mandela.45 Other
incarcerated people have described the pain caused by the death of a
loved one who cannot be properly mourned from a prison cell.46
Fourth, imprisonment produces feelings of physical stress. In
interviews with prisoners, imprisonment was characterized as
provoking sensations of pressure, weight, tightness, and suffocation.47
These sensations fit with the root of the word prison, from the Latin
word for “laying hold of” someone,48 as if the prisoner is being squeezed
inside of a giant hand. This creates an ongoing, psychological
discomfort that is palpable when reading prison writing. It is an aspect
of the prison experience that is difficult to capture in numbers or other
objective measurements.
Fifth, many incarcerated people describe a loss of self, sometimes
characterized as a psychological or spiritual death.49 Separated from
committed to reintegration . . . has come explicitly to embrace the opposite approach,
that of permanent exclusion.”).
42 Id. at 105. Rideau talks about the “emotional deprivation” of having no real
bonds. RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 338.
43 Women in the Criminal Justice System, CSPAN (July 16, 2019), https://www.cspan.org/video/?462673-1/women-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/UAB7-XHAD].
44 Id.
45 See Tayari Jones, Opinion, What Nelson Mandela Lost, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/opinion/sunday/nelson-mandela-tayari-jonesprison-letters.html [https://perma.cc/GL5F-VPRY].
46 See, e.g., Faruq (Robert Douglas Wideman), Lost and Gain, in LIFE SENTENCES:
WRITINGS FROM INSIDE AN AMERICAN PRISON 109 (Norm Conti et al. eds., 2019)
[hereinafter LIFE SENTENCES] (“In prison, you cannot go through the process of
gathering with relatives and friends to share grief.”).
47 See Ben Crewe, Depth, Weight, Tightness: Revisiting the Pains of Imprisonment, 13
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 509, 522 (2011).
48 OXFORD, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/prison (last visited Dec. 9,
2020) [https://perma.cc/A57D-QBED]. The Oxford English Dictionary lists the etymology
of the Old French prisun “the action of taking, imprisonment, captivity” coming from Latin
prehensionem. Prison, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
49 Loss of identity is experienced in its most basic form as being “just a number.”
Sexton, Under the Penal Gaze, supra note 40, at 52. This resonates with Erving
Goffman’s description of the process of inmate “mortification” in any “total institution,”
like a prison, where the inmate is stripped of “adult executive competency.” GOFFMAN,
supra note 14, at 43.
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support systems, made totally vulnerable, and enduring trauma and the
threat of trauma leads to feelings of being silenced and of being dead or
disembodied.50
It has been argued that the experience of a loss of self was an
intentional part of the rehabilitative script authored by the founders of
the first U.S. penitentiaries who believed that the prisoner should
undergo a spiritual death and rebirth in prison.51 While this was the
northern penitentiary model, the southern system of convict leasing and
plantation prisons was premised on the use of violence to secure
submission and labor from Black prisoners.52 In both models, however,
a fundamental feature was the destruction of the prisoner’s sense of self.
Before discussing the relevance of prison’s cruelties to sentencing, it
is important to say a few words about prison reform initiatives for the
reader who may wonder why this is not an Article about prison reform.
One possible response to prison’s cruelties is to conclude that prisons
should be reformed so that they are less cruel and resemble, for
example, the prisons of Norway.53 Reforming prisons through policy
changes or civil rights suits, however, misses the upstream opportunity
to apply knowledge about the harshness of prison to sentencing. Prison-

50 An incarcerated person describing the experience of serving a life sentence wrote,
“every day, I feel a piece of me die inside. It is a silent steady subtraction of a me that I
used to be: a concept of myself that I easily held and comprehended that I now can no
longer grasp.” Malakki (Ralph Bolden), Fit to Kill: A Reactionary Existence (Part One),
in LIFE SENTENCES, supra note 46, at 60; see also RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 64 (“I’m buried
alive.”).
51 SMITH, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing that late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century American “poetics of the penitentiary . . . were organized around a narrative of
rebirth, and that the narrative required, as a pre-condition, the convict’s virtual death”).
52 After the civil war, slavery was reconstituted in massive prison-farms and convict
leasing, neither of which were modeled on the death-rebirth mythology, but simply on
the idea of controlling Black bodies and harnessing their labor. See id. at 136. Prison
violence intersects with racialized patterns of violence in other areas of the criminal
system, like policing. See, e.g., TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015)
(tracing America’s history of violent racism from the institution of slavery through
carceral and policing systems); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF
THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
883366/download [https://perma.cc/P9HV-WAAX] (finding, inter alia, targeted, violent
policing of African-American residents); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS79-TL33] (finding the same).
53 I leave aside arguments about whether meaningful prison reform is possible. As
Caleb Smith argued, even the most reform-minded incarceration settings are designed
to annihilate the individual, to reduce the individual to a spiritual death, albeit in the
service of rebirth. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 208-09.
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as-experienced remains relevant to understanding conditions of
confinement and their impact on incarcerated people.
It is precisely because of the lack of control legislators and sentencing
courts have over the conditions of confinement that some general sense
of prison’s cruelties should be part of sentencing policy and practice.
Sentencing courts have no control over the prison conditions that the
defendant will encounter. The court can, however, factor the likely
prison experience into their calculations. The sentence-as-experienced
may otherwise be much more punitive and destructive than intended in
the more formulistic calculation at sentencing. To this end, voices
describing their experiences with incarceration provide a sense of
prison’s cruelties that can be applied to sentencing decisions.54
With the above characterization of prison’s cruelties in mind, I now
turn to a critique of the current practice in which sentencing authorities
measure the severity of punishment in units of time.
A. Punishment as a Number
Statutes define crimes and set out the parameters of permissible
punishment ranges.55 Aside from mandatory minimum sentences,
statutory sentencing schemes allow judges discretion to determine
whether to impose a sentence of incarceration and the length of the
sentence.56 The severity of the punishment of incarceration — as it is
commonly understood among sentencing authorities — can be
described in this equation:
Loss of Liberty x Number of Years = Punishment
Given the centrality of time to the severity of punishment, sentencing
authorities are preoccupied with deciding on the numbers. The
lawmaker decides how much time in prison is appropriate for each
crime. Prosecutors offer plea deals based on what they decide is an

54 See SHKLAR, supra note 28, at 50 (discussing the importance of understanding
social harms to political theories designed to remedy injustice).
55 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
56 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (explaining that a judge
exercises “wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in
determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by
law”).
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appropriate amount of time.57 The judge decides how much time in
prison (if any) is appropriate for each defendant.58
Deciding on the right number — the right amount of time — is
usually done with an eye toward ordinal ranking.59 Generally, criminal
statutes set up a system of ordinal ranking in which longer prison
sentences may be imposed for more serious crimes.60 In most
sentencing regimes, the seriousness of the crime is weighed in tandem
with various factors related to culpability and dangerousness, like the
defendant’s criminal history,61 the impact of the crime on the victim, 62
the defendant’s remorse,63 and so forth.64 Any of these variables related

57 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004) (arguing that “the law that determines
who goes to prison and for how long — is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by
legislators or judges”).
58 See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV.
171, 175 (2017) (noting the “enormous discretion” judges have in sentencing people
convicted of misdemeanors).
59 See Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1255-56 (2011) (citing Andrew von Hirsch, Penal
Theories, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659, 668 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1998)).
60 The federal sentencing guidelines, for example, create a system for scoring the
crime, criminal history, and other variables related to the defendant, and use those
numbers to locate the advised sentence length on a grid. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
GUIDELINES MANUAL 407 (2018).
61 See Mona Lynch, The Narrative of the Number: Quantification in Criminal Court,
44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 44-45 (2019) (arguing that, although the federal sentencing
guidelines attempted to quantify character in a criminal history score, litigants reframe
and qualify the score through narratives designed to provide context and assign
meaning).
62 See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 361, 362 (1996).
63 See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Criminal Justice, 8 EMOTION REV. 14, 14
(2016) (“Evaluations of remorse play a crucial role in a wide range of criminal justice
determinations. They influence sentencing hearings; parole, probation, and clemency
determinations; forensic evaluations; decisions on whether to try a juvenile as an adult;
and even (counterintuitively) determinations of guilt or innocence.”); M. Eve Hanan,
Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301, 313-14 (2018) (addressing how implicit cognitive
biases may affect judges when they decide whether to credit defendants’ displays of
remorse).
64 The jury must consider all mitigating aspects of the defendant and their
circumstances that reflect on personal culpability in death penalty cases. See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-328 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (noting that a “moral response” to the crime
requires consideration of all aspects of the defendant and their circumstances that reflect
on personal culpability and mitigation).
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to the crime and the defendant may move the length of sentence up or
down in the ordinal ranking.65
A time-based ranking of punishments promises two, related benefits.
First, sentence length comparisons may help to determine whether a
sentence is disproportionately long compared to other sentences in
similar cases, the culpability of the defendant, or the severity of the
crime.66 Second, comparison of length of sentences may uncover
disparities in sentencing practices based on jurisdiction, judge, or the
race and gender of the defendant.67 Without a numeric system of ordinal
ranking, it would be difficult to compare cases to determine
disproportionality.68
Yet, the system of ordinal ranking falls short of its promise of fairness.
Consider, for example, the federal sentencing guidelines, which assign
numeric values to sentencing variables to locate the appropriate
sentencing range on a grid.69 Despite expectations, implementation of
the federal sentencing guidelines failed to adequately mitigate racial

65 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (explaining that judges have
discretion to choose the sources and types of evidence they will use to determine the
kind and type of punishment imposed within limits fixed by law). Paul H. Robinson has
researched and defended popular intuitions about the ordinal ranking of sentence
lengths for crimes. See Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility,
Utility, and the Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1594-95 (2017);
Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz & Daniel M. Bartels, Extra-Legal Punishment
Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such
Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 805
(2012) (arguing that lay intuitions about the severity of punishment are “actually quite
nuanced and sophisticated”).
66 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61-62 (2010) (describing how life without
parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders is disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment’s punishments clause); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding
that life without parole was disproportionate punishment for minor crime, and thus
violated the cruel and unusual punishments’ clause of the Eighth Amendment).
67 See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, Or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 697-98 (2010) (describing
the political shift toward sentencing guidelines as, in part, a way to curb arbitrary and
discriminatory sentencing practices).
68 See Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults,
78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court employs ordinal
ranking in its proportionality analysis of punishment in juvenile life without parole
cases).
69 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 60, at 407.
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disparity in sentencing.70 Quantitative sentencing has not necessarily
increased uniformity or reduced disparity in sentencing.71
Preoccupation with a limited set of quantitative measures in
sentencing has reduced judicial consideration of qualitative information
about the person being sentenced.72 The obsessive focus on time also
eclipses another important aspect of the severity of punishment:
prison’s cruelties. The absence of weight accorded to consideration of
the qualitative aspects of imprisonment can be seen in public discussion
in high profile cases. For example, public outrage followed U.S. District
Court Judge T.S. Ellis III’s decision to sentence Paul Manafort to fortyseven months in prison for tax fraud, bank fraud, and other related
crimes.73 The media described the sentence as “just under four years,”
noting that the sentence was surprisingly short in comparison to the
federal sentencing guidelines’ recommendation of a sentence closer to
70 See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 296 (2001) (finding African
Americans are incarcerated at higher rates and receive longer sentences in study of
federal sentencing practices controlled for income, education, and criminal history);
Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral
Sentencing Process, 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES, & DECISIONS CRIM. JUST. SYS. 427, 427-28
(2000) (reviewing forty studies demonstrates consensus that racial disparity exists in
exercise of judicial discretion whether to incarcerate, but studies varied as to whether
evidence confirmed racial disparity in sentence length); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit
Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and
the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 4-5 (2013) (discussing factors that may have
contributed to continued racial disparity in sentencing after implementation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
71 See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 70, at 78; cf. John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality
of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54
UCLA L. REV. 235, 240 (2006) (finding that voluntary guidelines reduce some of the
flexibility that permits biases and other factors leading to sentencing disparity based on
a study of state guidelines effectiveness).
72 See Mona Lynch, Institutionalizing Bias: The Death Penalty, Federal Drug
Prosecutions, and Mechanisms of Disparate Punishment, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 123 (2013)
(discussing how “the Guidelines and statutory mandatory sentencing schemes have
aimed to minimize the human aspects of sentencing in ways that excise an
individualized and potentially empathic sentencing procedure”). As U.S. District Court
Judge Jed Rakoff stated, “the notion that . . . responsibility, can be reduced to the
mechanical adding-up of a small set of numbers artificially assigned to a few arbitrarilyselected variables wars with common sense.” Sentencing Memorandum and Order of
Rajat K. Gupta at 1-2, United States v. Rajat Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 11 Cr. 907). Judge Rakoff also expressed this view in his article. Jed S. Rakoff, Why
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 7 (2013).
73 E.g., Miles Parks & Ryan Lucas, Paul Manafort, Former Trump Campaign
Chairman, Sentenced to Just Under 4 Years, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:04 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/701045248/paul-manafort-former-trump-campaignchairman-sentenced-to-just-under-4-years [https://perma.cc/UVS7-CEMS].

2020]

Invisible Prisons

1201

twenty years.74 Stories circulated on public media of defendants who
received longer sentences for stealing quarters from laundromats and
for possession of marijuana.75
The Manafort outcry raised important concerns about fairness in the
ordinal ranking of crime and punishment — like cases being treated
alike. If equality among sentence lengths is the metric of fairness
(proportionality), then either Mr. Manafort’s sentence should be much
longer or most sentences for nonviolent felonies should be much
shorter.76 Of course, the numeric measurement does not tell us which
way the correction should go. One could argue that the sentence for
person who stole quarters was fair, and that the only correction should
be making Manafort’s sentence longer. On the other hand, one could
argue that Manafort’s sentence should stay the same and that the person
who stole quarters should receive a shorter sentence. In other words,
proportionality only measures the relationship among sentences
without providing a broader framework to critique sentencing policy
and practice.77
74

See id.
See Faith Karimi, Paul Manafort Gets 47 Months. Legal Experts Share Examples of
People Who Got More Time for Less, CNN (Mar. 8, 2019, 8:16 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/08/politics/paul-manafort-sentencing-social-media-reactiontrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/QX8Q-QNM6]. At the same time, others pointed out that
Manafort’s sentence was in line with other fraud cases in the Eastern District of Virginia,
where defendants were sentenced to between twenty-four and thirty-six months. See Christal
Hayes, Was Paul Manafort’s Sentence Too Light? Here’s How It Compares with Other Cases,
USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/07/paulmanafort-prison-sentence-2017-federal-data/3099176002/
[https://perma.cc/9XMBL7EL]; Justin Jouvenal, Julie Tate & Rachel Weiner, Is Paul Manafort’s Sentence Too
Light? He Fared Worse Than Many Fraudsters, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/is-paul-manaforts-sentence-too-lighthe-fared-worse-than-many-fraudsters-data-shows/2019/03/08/388226b6-41c3-11e99361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html [https://perma.cc/SPU8-PUAB].
76 The idea that everyone convicted of a crime should be sentenced as leniently as
a small subset of privileged offenders has been popularly expressed as a call to “level
down” prison sentences. When asked how racial disparity in sentencing could be
eliminated, for example, musician and criminal justice reform advocate John Legend
answered, “Yeah, level down not level up.” Mehdi Hasan, How to Fix the Criminal
(In)Justice System: With John Legend and Patrisse Cullors, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://theintercept.com/2020/02/13/how-to-fix-the-criminal-injustice-system-withjohn-legend-and-patrisse-cullors/ [https://perma.cc/R7A3-H95H].
77 See O’Hear, supra note 68, at 1090. Proportionality analyses — at least at the
constitutional level — have fared no better. The Supreme Court has been loath to find
disproportionality based on the comparative length of prison sentences. The Supreme
Court has even declined to hold disproportionate sentences of twenty-five years to life
in prison for a repeat, nonviolent offense. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-30
(2003); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (requiring a threshold
75
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Because proportionality is relative, sentence lengths have no built-in
ceiling other than in reference to more and less serious crimes. As a
result, sentencing by the numbers can easily fall prey to cognitive errors
and political pressures, specifically, the cognitive phenomenon of
anchoring and political phenomenon of inflation. Cognitive anchoring
is a psychological theory that describes how people become attached to
the first number mentioned in a negotiation.78 Anchoring can affect
lawmakers enacting punishment statutes as well as courtroom actors.79
If the current penalty for armed robbery is ten years, for example,
sentencing reform legislation is unlikely to reduce the penalty to one
year because it is too far from the anchoring number.80 Anchoring
works in tandem with the political phenomenon of sentence inflation
to ensure that any change in the punishment is likely to be an increase
in sentence length.81 William Stuntz famously characterized criminal
lawmaking as a “one-way ratchet,” with lawmakers pressured to
constantly get tougher on crime by criminalizing more acts and
lengthening prison terms.82 Lawmakers demonstrate that they are tough
on crime by arguing for longer prison sentences and face political
criticism when they argue for shorter sentences for crimes.83

showing of “gross disproportionality” under the punishments clause of the Eighth
Amendment).
78 See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind-Spot”
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014) (defining “anchoring effect” as a term used in
cognitive psychology).
79 See id. at 503-11 (discussing anchoring effect studies of judges in Germany and
the U.S.).
80 See id. at 523-29 (describing how the anchoring effect shapes federal sentencing
by anchoring judges to the numbers in the guidelines).
81 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 530 (2001) (describing how “legislative candidates frequently refer to sentencing
policy in their campaigns — a broader death penalty, more prison time for drug
dealers”). The federal First Step Act and the Justice Reinvestment Initiatives in various
states appear to be an exception to Stuntz’s one-way ratchet observation. See First Step
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (reducing and restricting
enhanced sentencing for prior drug felonies). On closer examination, it is clear that
lawmakers’ ability to reduce penalties for certain crimes is conditioned on public
perception that the people who commit those crimes are non-violent, non-repeat
offenders, and not sexual offenders. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE
AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 165 (2015).
82 Stuntz, supra note 81, at 547 (“[L]egislators will tend to see criminal law as a
one-way ratchet.”).
83 See Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 150
(2013) (during the tough-on-crime era, “most jurisdictions enacted some or all of
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Thus, although the length of a sentence allows for a unified measure
to distinguish and rank punishment, it is a thin measure of severity
because it obscures the qualitative aspects of prison’s cruelties. If one
really considers the experience of imprisonment, exclamations like “He
only got four years!” seem preposterous. Four years for a living being
in a cell is excruciating.84 We can perceive four years as de minimis only
by ignoring the qualitative experience of imprisonment and focusing
exclusively on comparisons in the ordinal ranking of lengths of time.85
To be clear, I am advocating for a conceptualization of punishment
that includes a general understanding of prison’s cruelties. I am not
suggesting an ordinal ranking of punishment that varies based on prison
conditions.86 Any individual experience of incarceration will vary based
on factors outside of the court’s control, such as the defendant’s
placement within the prison system and the policies of a new warden.87
Sentencing courts have little power over conditions of confinement.88
If, however, certain generalizations can be made, there is no reason not
to consider prison’s cruelties in sentencing policy and practice.89 The
next subpart addresses how prison-as-experienced is relevant to specific
aspects of punishment theory that lawmakers and judges consider.
B. Prison-As-Experienced and the Traditional Goals of Sentencing
Traditional punishment theory holds that sentencing may serve any
of four purposes: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and

mandatory minimum sentence, truth-in-sentencing, ‘sexual predator,’ ‘career criminal,’
three-strikes, and [life without parole] laws”).
84 Incarcerated for five years, the poet Jimmy Santiago de Baca describes numerous
harrowing and often life-threatening prison experiences. See JIMMY SANTIAGO BACA, A
PLACE TO STAND: THE MAKING OF A POET (2001).
85 Indeed, some incarcerated people describe an absence of time, or the sensation
that time is standing still, while they are incarcerated. See e.g., Sexton, Under the Penal
Gaze, supra note 40, at 104.
86 For a thorough and intriguing discussion of considering the individual’s
subjective experience of punishment at sentencing, see generally Kolber, The Subjective
Experience, supra note 23, at 183.
87 See discussion infra Part I.C; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994).
88 See Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in THE
NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 111, 134 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds.,
2017).
89 See generally Kolber, supra note 22, at 14-20 (arguing for a “justificationsymmetry principle” in which unintentional but anticipated aspects of the pains of
imprisonment must also be justified as part of the punishment).
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rehabilitation.90 The four goals are discussed by courts determining
whether a sentence is excessive,91 and by lawmakers setting parameters
for judicial sentencing.92 Below, I discuss the relevance of prison’s
cruelties to each sentencing goal. In general, my argument is that failure
to consider prison’s cruelties increases the gap between the express
purpose of the sentence and its actual impact on the person sentenced.93
This gap — or lack of reality check — also results in sentences that lack
proportionality and parsimony.
1.

Proportionality in Retribution

Retribution has been a theoretical cornerstone of sentencing in the
United States, endorsed by some legal scholars,94 and evidenced in
popular understanding.95 Retribution involves the intentional infliction
of pain, but no more pain than deserved for the crime, meaning that
retribution should be limited by the principle of proportionality.96
Above, I discussed how punishment as a number facilitates analysis
of relative proportionality — the comparison of the length of one
sentence with the length of another. Yet, the institutional norms
regarding sentence length have no inherent logic, which would allow

90 See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70-74 (2005)
[hereinafter Punishment Purposes]; see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in
Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 369-71 (1997) [hereinafter Sentencing
Principles]. The list of four is not exhaustive and can include other goals such as
uniformity. See Punishment Purposes, supra, at 74.
91 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (listing deterrence,
incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation as legitimate penological goals).
92 See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011) (describing that the Federal
Sentencing Reform Act cabins sentencing to the four goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
93 Legal scholars correctly point to the gap between the stated goals of sentencing
and the realities of mass incarceration. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged
Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1241 (2012) (describing retribution
as the “stock story” of sentencing, and incapacitation the driving force of sentencing
policy).
94 See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 91
(1997) (recognizing retribution as a theory of criminal law’s function); Herbert Morris,
Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477-78 (1968) (arguing that humans have a
right to punishment and that punishing recognizes offenders as rational humans).
95 See generally Robinson, et al., supra note 65 (discussing an empirical study of lay
views of punishment).
96 See Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72
MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1974) (“Desert: No sanction greater than that ‘deserved’ by
the last crime or bout of crimes for which the offender is being sentenced should be
imposed.”).
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for consideration of whether the sentence is proportional for the
defendant in an absolute sense.97 As Robert Ferguson puts it, “[t]here
is, after all, no particular rationale to the length of a sentence except in
rote legal insistence on it.”98 Instead, “[t]he length of a term in prison
depends not on an absolute standard but on its relative position on a
grid containing other sentences for other crimes.”99 The numbers tell us
nothing about the severity of the punishment other than by comparison
to other numbers.
One can imagine how prison-as-experienced could be relevant to
determining what punishment is deserved. After all, the punishment is
not simply being removed from society for a certain amount of time. It
is also the experiences the person will have in prison, including: being
either the victim of violence or under threat of violence; vulnerability
to the whims of institutional actors; isolation from friends and family;
and the loss of identity and sense of self.100 Adam Kolber makes this
point in his analysis of the relevance of individualized, subjective
experiences of punishment.101 Kolber offers a compelling description of
how individual variations in “sensitivity” to punishment are
theoretically relevant to sentencing.102 The purpose of the punishment
is to inflict suffering on the prisoner.103 Punishment is more severe the
more the incarcerated person suffers.104 While Kolber’s thesis met with
some criticism,105 Michael Tonry pointed out that the retributivism
traditionally accepted the relevance of the subjective experience of
punishment to its severity.106

97 See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 588-97 (2005).
98 ROBERT A. FERGUSON, METAMORPHOSIS: HOW TO TRANSFORM PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 153 (2018) [hereinafter METAMORPHOSIS].
99 Id.
100 See discussion supra Part I.
101 Kolber, The Subjective Experience, supra note 23, at 196-98.
102 See id. at 198.
103 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Johnathan Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2009) (“When the state punishes a criminal,
it inflicts suffering.”).
104 See Kolber, The Subjective Experience, supra note 23, at 198.
105 E.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1617, 1623-25 (2010)
(critiquing Kolber’s argument); see also Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts:
The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 917-22
(2010) (same).
106 See Michael Tonry, Is Proportionality in Punishment Possible?, in OF ONE-EYED AND
TOOTHLESS MISCREANTS: MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME? 1, 19 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2019) (arguing that it should not be controversial to claim that the subjective
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Application of Kolber’s individualized sensibilities to incarceration is
complex, and I do not address it here. But similar logic suggests that a
general — rather than individualistic — understanding of prison’s
cruelties is relevant to considering the weight of prison as a punishment.
Perhaps no one deserves much of what occurs in prison. It is very
possible prison is often harsher and harsher in more ways than
legislators and legal actors can keep in mind when making punishment
decisions.107 And, prison’s cruelties may be greater than what the
sentencing judge intended.108 The quality of the punishment is not
simply an absence of liberty and an absence from society. It is a lived,
daily experience of prison for the incarcerated person.
2.

Parsimony in Deterrence and Incapacitation

In addition to retribution, punishment has traditionally been justified
on the grounds of its capacity to deter crime and incapacitate the
perpetrator of a crime.109 Along with rehabilitation, deterrence and
incapacitation are referred to as utilitarian goals of punishment because
their value is measured by their outcome.110
Prison’s cruelties are relevant to determining the parsimony of a
punishment designed to incapacitate the defendant or to deter future
crime.111 Jeremy Bentham articulated the principle of parsimony, calling
it a principle of “frugality.”112 According to Bentham, the punishment
should inflict no pain greater than what is required to accomplish its
goal.113 In other words, a punishment designed to deter future crime
should inflict no more pain than necessary to deter commission of the
crime in the future, and a punishment designed to incapacitate someone

experience of punishment is relevant to both Kant’s idea of retributivism and Bentham’s
idea of the frugality principle).
107 See FERGUSON, INFERNO, supra note 26, at 103 (“Lawmakers recommend
draconian punishments without bothering to share any responsibility for further
interpretation or enforcement.”).
108 See id. at 127 (arguing that judges are “insulated from the practical implications”
of the punishments they order).
109 See Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 90, at 70-73.
110 See id. at 69-70.
111 See Morris, supra note 96, at 1163.
112 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 142 (Batoche Books 1999) (1781). Bentham understood that the
magnitude of punishment must be measured not just by its duration, but also by its
intensity. See id. at 146.
113 Id. at 142.
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should inflict no more punishment than necessary to protect the
public.114
With regard to incapacitation, I have argued elsewhere that
imprisoning someone who is no longer a threat to public safety violates
the principle of parsimony.115 Imprisonment, however, does much more
than incapacitate. As discussed in the introduction to this Part, prison
imposes a set of pains and difficulties that have nothing to do with
rendering the incarcerated person harmless to others. Someone could,
theoretically, be separated from society but exposed to no further
cruelties or hardships.116 A sentence may lack parsimony because it is
too long, but also because the very experience of imprisonment in U.S.
prisons is extravagantly harsh compared to the modest goal of
restraining — incapacitating — behavior.117
Prison’s cruelties have similar relevance to deterrence arguments. The
goal of specific deterrence is to dissuade the defendant from committing
crime in the future by imposing a punishment that makes criminality
seem more costly.118 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that prison
deters the person punished, mere confinement may accomplish the
goal.119 The panoply of prison’s cruelties lack parsimony if they exceed
what is necessary to deter the incarcerated person from committing the
same crime.
The same argument holds true for general deterrence, but with an odd
twist. Prison’s cruelties may exceed what is needed to deter the public
from committing crimes. Oddly, however, ignorance about the
qualitative aspects of prison-as-experienced thwarts the goal of general

114 Bentham’s strong preference was deterrence, and he expressed great concern that
incapacitation through disabling punishments are almost always violative of the
principle of frugality. Id. at 152-53.
115 See M. Eve Hanan, Incapacitating Errors: Sentencing and the Science of Change, 97
DENV. L. REV. 151, 187 (2019).
116 See, e.g., Jessica Benko, The Radical Humanness of Norway’s Halden Prison, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/the-radicalhumaneness-of-norways-halden-prison.html [https://perma.cc/ZPX3-8778] (describing a
prison in Norway designed primarily to support and rehabilitate inmates).
117 Interestingly, Bentham expressed concern that incapacitative punishment would
often lack parsimony because it prevents the punished person from doing good in the
future. See BENTHAM, supra note 112, at 152-53.
118 See Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 90, at 371.
119 It is unclear the degree to which the threat of incarceration deters crime, with
some research concluding that the deterrent effect of the threat of apprehension greatly
outweighs the threat of lengthy prison sentences. See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the
Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201 (2013).
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deterrence.120 If punishment is meant to deter others from committing
a similar crime because they fear the punishment they see, hiding
aspects of the punishment from the public make it ineffective as a
deterrent. From a historical perspective, as punishment moved from the
“spectacle of the scaffold” to the interior space of the prison,121 the
general public was left to imagine what imprisonment would be like.122
This is arguably why prison is the source of so much curiosity and the
setting of so many fictional works.123 Yet, the invisible nature of prison’s
cruelties reduces its power as a deterrent. One may be just as likely to
hear opinions that prison is too comfortable as one is to hear horror
stories about prison’s cruelty and violence.124
3.

Frustrating Rehabilitation and Specific Deterrence

Another compelling reason exists for considering prison-asexperienced when evaluating the utilitarian purpose of sentencing: to
shed empirical light on whether the imprisonment thwarts
rehabilitation and specific deterrence. This is not the parsimony or
proportionality arguments that I make above, but an argument that the
punishment of incarceration may impede rehabilitation or specific
deterrence.
Both rehabilitation and specific deterrence aim to change the
defendant’s behavior to be more law-abiding.125 Imprisonment,
however, may accomplish the opposite result by weakening the
120 See FERGUSON, INFERNO, supra note 26, at 58 (discussing how keeping the nature
of prison life hidden reduces the intended deterrent effect of seeing someone punished).
121 SMITH, supra note 1, at 13.
122 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 9 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
123 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 17-18 (discussing the lack of public outcry to prison
expansion is due in part to the realities of prison being hidden).
124 Studies find a wide range of popular perceptions of prisons. Kevin H. Wozniak,
American Public Opinion About Prisons, 38 CRIM. J. REV. 302, 314-317 (2014) (noting a
survey study failing to support the claim that a majority of Americans think prison is
too comfortable but finding that 46.6% of people surveyed believe that prison should
be harsher). Public concern that some prisons may be too comfortable to fulfill their
punitive purpose seems to have originated after the Watergate scandal when some of
the perpetrators were sent to well-resourced, federal prison camps. Evan Osnos, When
Going to Jail, It Pays to Be Rich, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 2002, at C1. Most media reports,
however, dispel the idea that any U.S. prison could be compared to a resort. See, e.g.,
Lacey Rose, The Best Places to Go to Prison, FORBES (May 25, 2006),
https://www.forbes.com/2006/04/17/best-prisons-federal_cx_lr_06slate_0418bestprisons.
html#359611e71716 [https://perma.cc/4RZQ-4GVJ] (describing federal prison camps
that have no fencing and some amenities).
125 See Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 90, at 70.
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incarcerated person’s ability to make good choices in the future.126 In
an “institutional paradox beyond contradiction,” prison removes almost
all opportunities for the incarcerated person to make choices, thereby
weakening the person’s ability to make good choices upon release.127
Likewise, the damage done through prison’s cruelties may
psychologically damage incarcerated people in ways incompatible with
rehabilitation.128
Moreover, the arbitrary way in which power is exercised in prison
undermines efforts to encourage law-abiding behavior. Arbitrary
authority causes people to discount the reasonableness of the authority
figure and the benefit of following the rules.129 Seeing bad acts go
unpunished and innocent behavior punished in prison would lead a
rational actor (if such a person exists)130 to conclude that there is no
benefit to following the rules or abiding by the law.131 Thus, the
harshness, lack of choices, and maddening sense of absurdity that
comes from witnessing power exercised in arbitrary ways all thwart
efforts to deter or rehabilitate.
The arguments presented in this section about the relevance of
prison-as-experienced may be uncontroversial. Quantitative data are
routinely gathered to determine, for example, whether the length of the
sentence affects recidivism rates.132 Accounts of prison-as-experienced
126 See Federica Coppola, Valuing Emotions in Punishment: An Argument for Social
Rehabilitation with the Aid of Social and Affective Neuroscience, NEUROETHICS (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9393-4 [https://perma.cc/JQU2-G53V] (noting
that “incarceration can stimulate the same . . . behavioral tendencies that have been
. . . qualified as a risk factor for antisocial conduct”).
127 FERGUSON, METAMORPHOSIS, supra note 98, at 137.
128 See Coppola, supra note 126, at 8 (stating that “incarceration can be not only
psychologically devastating, but it is also counterproductive”). Some empirical data
suggest that imprisonment does not reduce recidivism. See generally Daniel P. Mears,
Joshua C. Cochran, William D. Bales & Avinash S. Bhati, Recidivism and Time Served in
Prison, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 83 (2016) (discussing mixed recidivism results
depending on the length of time served).
129 Arbitrary and unjust authority figures are viewed with skepticism and, thus, lack
legitimacy. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (discussing
why the legitimacy of authority is essential for public compliance); Tom R. Tyler, The
Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference to Authorities,
1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 323 (1997) (finding a strong correlation between
perception of legitimacy and social relationships).
130 See generally Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 133 (2000) (casting doubt on rational decision-making in favor of contextspecific rationality influenced by cognitive errors and other variables).
131 See Tyler, supra note 129, at 323.
132 See generally Mears et al., supra note 128 (discussing mixed recidivism results
depending on length of time served). Quantitative data on recidivism rates and mental
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can be understood as another kind of data — qualitative data — that
are useful and relevant to sentencing.
Sentencing authorities increasingly acknowledge the relevance of
prison’s cruelties. The State’s Attorney for Chittenden County in
Vermont, for example, requires her line attorneys to visit prison.133 The
purpose of the prison visit is to make prosecutors “more cognizant of
the space you’re sending people to when you put an arbitrary number
on an offer sheet.”134 Prosecutors on staff, she told the press, “should
also fully understand what prison means, and what a jail sentence
means for these individuals. As prosecutors, we get very comfortable
with just throwing out numbers as an amount of time.”135
C. Towards a Theory of Injustice in Punishment
Above, I discussed how prison’s cruelties provide essential insight
into the gap between the realities of prison and the traditional goals and
limiting principles of sentencing. Here, I argue that prison’s cruelties
are relevant to broader critiques of incarceration.
Critiquing what is unjust about incarceration requires an inventory
of prison’s cruelties. As Sharon Dolovich and Alexandra Natapoff argue:
[A]ny adequate conception of American criminal justice needs
to push the boundaries of the standard view, to expose and
encompass more of what actually happens on both the front and
back ends. This reality is lived by flesh-and-blood human
beings, a fact that the standard focus on formal rules and
processes tends to ignore, but which must be front and center
in any morally adequate understanding of the criminal
system.136
People’s experiences in prison provide information about “what
actually happens” and are thus essential to “any morally adequate
health issues among incarcerated people, for example, is regularly gathered and — more
controversially — used predictively at sentencing. See generally Erin Collins, Punishing
Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57 (2018) (critiquing the expansion of the use of risk/needs
assessments from correctional agency use to sentencing).
133 Daniel Nichanian, Prosecutor Sends Staff to Prison, in a Bid to Counter Their Reflex
to Incarcerate, APPEAL (Aug. 14, 2019), https://theappeal.org/polreport/vermontprosecutor-sends-staff-to-prison-in-a-bid-to-counter-their-reflex-to-incarcerate/
[https://perma.cc/6S4W-MG6D].
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 SHARON DOLOVICH & ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING
9 (2017).
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understanding” of injustice at sentencing.137 I mean to invoke injustice
as Judith Shklar defines it in her seminal work on the subject.138 Shklar
argues that creating theories of injustice must precede creating theories
of justice.139 To identify systemic injustices, she argues, one should first
attempt to learn about the harms people are experiencing. Cataloguing
first-person experiences of harm eventually leads to a “non-ideal
theory” of injustice that can be used to evaluate policy and law.140
In contrast, theories of justice often conflate systemic harms with
mere bad luck because the theory assumes justice is the norm.141 If,
however, certain harms are widespread, they should be understood as
systemic injustices.142 Shklar’s critique of theories of justice that mistake
injustice for bad luck applies to punishment theory. If we imagine
prison as an abstract place of confinement, an incident in which a
prisoner is beaten or raped will be viewed as an aberration. But if,
instead, our view of prison is based on a catalogue of concrete examples
of how incarcerated people experience prison, prison violence no longer
seems like a random moment of bad luck, but, instead, like a reflection
of the baseline injustice of prison itself.
By way of illustration, take, for example, the dignity principle in
sentencing. The Supreme Court has stated that punishment must not
137

Id.
See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 50 (1990) (defining injustice as “an
integral part of our social and personal experiences, whether private or public, and that
plays an essential part in democratic theory and practice”).
139 See id. at 80-81.
140 Note that Shklar describes the political process of identifying injustice, rather
than the legal process. See id. at 50. Whether prison conditions violate a statute or the
constitutional rights of the prisoner is a question circumscribed by doctrinal
constraints. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that the “Eighth
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and
unusual ‘punishments’”). See generally Dolovich, supra note 18 (discussing the
implications of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment). Whether
an action or failure to act by prison officials constitutes punishment has been held to
depend on the punisher’s mental state. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991).
Current legal doctrine seems to require intent. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. This
“structural view” of punishment limits what can be challenged as unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. See Thomas K. Landry, “Punishment” and the Eighth
Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1607, 1610 (1996).
141 See JOSÉ MEDINA, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RESISTANCE: GENDER AND RACIAL
OPPRESSION, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND RESISTANT IMAGINATIONS 13 (2013) (citing SHKLAR,
supra note 138, at 17) (“This normal model of justice does not ignore injustice but it
does tend to reduce it to a prelude to or a rejection and breakdown of justice, as if
injustice were a surprising abnormality.”); see also FRICKER, supra note 25, at 39
(arguing that “testimonial injustice is a normal part of discursive life”).
142 See SHKLAR, supra note 138, at 80-82.
138

1212

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 54:1185

be “degrading to human dignity.”143 The dignity principle forbids
torture, as well as deprivation of “basic sustenance, including adequate
medical care.”144 Dignity is presumed to be the norm (the ideal theory
of justice), and departures from dignity the exception.145 Yet accounts
of prison-as-experienced characterize prison life as a continuous assault
on human dignity.146 Calls for a theory of justice based on an enhanced
understanding of the dignity principle may thus be premature.147 What
is needed first is a theory of injustice that accounts for systemic assaults
on dignity in prisons.148
To accurately evaluate the ethics and impact of incarceration, prison’s
cruelties must be accounted for as part of a system of punishment rather
than as an aberration. This accounting may lead to the conclusion that
prisons are simply not an ethical response to crime.149 The problem is
not that we have too many people in prison for too long,150 but that
incarceration itself is wrong.151Allegra McLeod demonstrates this
abolitionist orientation in response to systemic violence in criminal
legal systems152 Prosecution and incarceration, she argues, are
essentially violent, even before the occurrence of an act of violence in
prison. Likewise, if prison’s cruelties are inherent in imprisonment,

143

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011).
145 See SHKLAR, supra note 138, 18-19 (discussing drawbacks of imagining injustice
as a temporary absence of justice).
146 See, e.g., RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 338 (describing imprisonment as being
“assaulted psychologically and emotionally, [in a] way in which you are robbed of any
dignity as a human being and told in countless ways that you don’t matter”).
147 Jonathan Simon and Jeffrey Fagan have both proposed dignity tests of
punishment. See Jeffrey Fagan, Dignity is the New Legitimacy, in THE NEW CRIMINAL
JUSTICE THINKING 311, 316 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (noting
the need for a new “set of principles for thinking about the harms of order
maintenance”); Jonathan Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v.
Florida to Abolition of Life Without Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW
DEATH PENALTY? 282, 285-86 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012).
148 See Landry, supra note 140, at 1610.
149 See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 83 (situating prison abolition as a response to prison’s
systemic injustices).
150 See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117
MICH. L. REV. 259 (2018) (analyzing the meanings behind different articulations of
“mass incarceration”).
151 See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 50-51.
152 See Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of
Unfinished Alternatives, 8 HARV. UNBOUND 109, 113 (2013) [hereinafter Confronting
Criminal Law’s Violence]; Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62
UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1167-68 (2015).
144
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then all of prison’s cruelties must be considered in a normative
assessment of the carceral state.
In this Part, I offered a critique of quantitative sentencing insofar as
the severity of the punishment is measured by a number — amount of
time without liberty. I then discussed the relevance of prison’s cruelties
to sentencing policy and practice. In the next Part, I return to the puzzle
of the lack of actual influence that prison-as-experienced has on
sentencing policy. Given its relevance, it is deeply troubling that
information about prison-as-experienced has so little purchase in
sentencing settings. Epistemic injustice provides a theoretical
framework for understanding this failure.
II.

EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: DISINTEREST AND IGNORANCE

Plenty of boys had talked of the secret graveyard before, but as
it had ever been with Nickel, no one believed them until
someone else said it.153
In this Part, I use the framework of epistemic injustice theory to take
a deeper look at the relationship between the apparent information and
interest deficits among sentencing authorities toward prison’s cruelties.
Despite widespread accessibility of information about prison-asexperienced, sentencing authorities nevertheless appear to discount,
ignore, or deem it irrelevant to punishment decisions. Epistemic
injustice scholar, José Medina, frames the question this way: “How do
we remain ignorant even when we have a wealth of evidence available?
How does this kind of epistemic insensitivity or numbness come
about?”154
Epistemic injustice theory illuminates how and why this happens.
Certain groups are excluded from producing knowledge due to
disinterest or distrust of those groups.155 The result is a reduction of
both knowledge of and interest in the experiences of the disfavored
group.156 Importantly, a lack of interest also leads to ignorance because
accounts from the excluded group are ignored. In other words, not

153 COLSON WHITEHEAD, THE NICKEL BOYS 5 (2019). In this historical novel, Nickel is
a detention facility (prison) for boys adjudicated delinquent based closely on the Dozier
School for Boys that operated in Florida for over a century.
154 MEDINA, supra note 141, at 146.
155 See generally FRICKER, supra note 25, at 30-41, 152-60 (discussing stereotypes and
hermeneutical marginalization as reasons for epistemic injustice).
156 See generally id. at 161-68 (discussing the effects of hermeneutical injustice on
marginalized groups).

1214

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 54:1185

caring, not knowing, and construing as irrelevant, function as a
mutually reinforcing loop.
Below, I describe the theory of epistemic injustice and its articulation
of the epistemic harms caused by excluding certain social groups from
knowledge production. I then elaborate upon the unconscious and
structural mechanisms that cause people to engage in epistemic
injustice. Finally, I illustrate how epistemic injustice works to silence
incarcerated voices speaking about prison conditions using the recent
account of the children’s bodies uncovered in unmarked graves at the
Dozier School for Boys — a juvenile prison in Florida.157
A. The Philosophical Study of Epistemic Injustice
Epistemic injustice is a new area of political philosophy that concerns
itself with how knowledge production is damaged by excluding or
discrediting the speech of certain social groups.158 It has deep
antecedents in feminist,159 and critical race scholarship,160 as well as in
Continental philosophy.161 Two aspects of injustice relate to how and
157 The hidden history of the Dozier School for Boys was the basis of Colson
Whitehead’s novel, The Nickel Boys. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 153, at 211.
158 Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., Introduction to the Routledge
Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 1,
1 (Ian James Kidd et al. eds., 2017). The phrase epistemic injustice was coined by
Miranda Fricker in EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING (2007).
159 See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING FROM
WOMEN’S LIVES 119 (1991) (arguing for a “standpoint epistemology” that acknowledges
that interpretation and assignation of meaning vary depending on one’s social position);
Nancy Tuana, Feminist Epistemology, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 125, 126-27 (identifying antecedent feminist and anticolonial philosophy antecedent to epistemic injustice); Kristie Dotson, “Thinking
Familiar with the Interstitial”: An Introduction, 29 HYPATIA 1, 3 (2014) (describing how
the voice of feminist philosophers are often suppressed).
160 See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 9 (2d ed. 2000) (comparing aims of
African American political thought to Marxist goals for equity); Charles W. Mills,
Ideology, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 100,
101 (tracing the discussion of epistemic injustice back to Marxist philosophy).
161 See Amy Allen, Power/Knowledge/Resistance: Foucault and Epistemic Injustice, in
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 187 (arguing that
Foucault was “a theorist of epistemic injustice avant la lettre” because he studied how
structural power relationships affect what we think and what we think we know).
Foucault observed that to be credited as valid, the discipline requires that the speaker
be qualified to speak and that the speaker communicates in a way that matches the
discipline’s method, style, and substance. See id. at 191 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT,
“SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED” 184 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David
Macey trans., 2003)). Arguably, Foucault’s method of genealogical analysis attempted
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what we know: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.162 Testimonial
injustice occurs when “prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level
of credibility to a speaker’s word.”163 It results from an unwarranted
decision that the speaker lacks the credibility or competence to convey
information.164 Not restricted to formal testimony, it refers to any
speech designed to convey information to another person.165 The
decision not to credit the speaker’s knowledge is unwarranted because
it is not based on a fair assessment of the speaker’s credibility but,
rather, on a stereotype about “people like” the speaker.166 Importantly,
the injustice is usually ongoing and pervasive across contexts because
it is based on “prejudices that ‘track’ the [speaker] through different
dimensions of social activity.”167
Prisoners fit well as a group against whom identity prejudice is at
work. General sentiments that prisoners (“convicts”) are untrustworthy
manifests in rules permitting impeachment of witnesses with prior
convictions for certain crimes.168 Skepticism about prisoners’
trustworthiness also manifests in critiques of “frivolous” prisoner civil
rights suits.169 While frivolity refers to a lack of legal merit, which can
result from a real harm that is not legally actionable,170 the frivolity
critique also suggests the widespread view that prisoners’ reports of
to excavate and present “knowledges that were disqualified by the hierarchy of erudition
and sciences.” Id. at 192.
162 Critically, Fricker follows Judith Shklar’s lead, discussed supra, in developing a
non-ideal theory of injustice rather than a theory of justice. See FRICKER, supra note 25,
at 39.
163 Id. at 1.
164 See id. at 17.
165 Id. at 1.
166 See id. at 23. Fricker addresses the listener’s innocence and culpability at length,
but this discussion is not relevant to this Article. See generally id. at 20-27 (discussing
the listener’s blameworthiness).
167 Id. at 27.
168 Anna Roberts wrote a trilogy of articles critiquing rules permitting impeachment
of witnesses with prior convictions. See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1977 (2016); Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55
B.C. L. REV. 563, 592-06 (2014); Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the
Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit
Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 873-82 (2016).
169 See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 937-38 (1990)
(describing judicial perception of pro se prisoner litigation as largely frivolous).
170 See Katherine A. MacFarlane, Shadow Judges: Staff Attorney Adjudication of
Prisoner Claims, 95 OR. L. REV. 97, 114-17 (2016) (listing perception of prisoner civil
rights claims as “frivolous” or meritless as one of the psychological hurdles to assuring
prisoner access to federal adjudication of their 1983 claims).
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their experiences are exaggerated,171 untrue,172 or simply
unintelligible.173 Official discussion of prisoner grievances is often
cursory with little effort to dig deeply into the facts alleged.174 In
legislative debates about the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), for
example, Senator Orrin Hatch characterized prisoners bringing civil
rights suits as the central problem with prisoner civil rights litigation.
He argued: “Jailhouse lawyers with little else to do are tying our courts
in knots with an endless flood of frivolous litigation.”175 This mistrust
of prisoner speech about prison conditions is directly tied to the identity
of the speakers as a disfavored and mistrusted group — convicted
criminals.176
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the speaker is excluded from
the project of collective meaning-making.177 The word, hermeneutic,
comes from the Greek word for interpretation. Hermeneutics, in the
sociological sense, is understanding the meaning that participants in a

171 See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An
Inside View of Pro Se Actions in Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 182 (1972)
(describing prisoner civil rights complaints as, inter alia, reporting to hyperbole).
172 See, e.g., Wayne T. Westling & Patricia Rasmussen, Prisoners’ Access to the Courts:
Legal Requirements and Practical Realities, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 273, 309 (1985)
(suggesting that pro se prisoner pleadings bury the claim “in a tangle of facts,
extraneous material, unsupported assertions, and fallacious arguments”).
173 See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA, JARED BATAILLON & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF
CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES 21-22 (2011) (survey of sixty-one chief judges
finding that they view pro se pleadings by prisoners as often unintelligible).
174 See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520-22 (1996) (discussing how a better understanding of the
facts in three prisoner suits demonstrated legitimate claims, which a letter by four state
attorneys general initially condemned as frivolous). In fact, in order to contain the
content of prisoners’ expression of their grievances, almost all federal district courts
provide forms for prisoners to use as their initial pleading in § 1983 claims against the
prison. See Richard H. Frankel & Alistair E. Newbern, Prisoners and Pleading, 94 WASH.
U. L. REV. 899, 899, 909 (2017). Troublingly, “[s]eventy-three percent of current form
complaints instruct prisoners to state the facts ‘briefly’ or ‘as briefly as possible,’ and
discourage them from providing detailed factual allegations.” Id. at 905. Although
understandable from a legal perspective, the result is to constrain expression of
grievances, to reduce elaboration.
175 141 CONG. REC. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
176 If we need further proof that prisoners are mistrusted, look no further than
evidentiary rules that permit impeachment of witnesses with evidence that they have
been convicted of crime. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of a
Criminal Conviction).
177 See Fricker, supra note 25, at 158 (arguing that hermeneutical injustice occurs
when “one’s social experience [is] obscured from collective understanding”).
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social situation assign to that situation.178 Fricker uses the term to mean
how we arrive at a shared, social meaning of something.179 Powerful
groups in society have an “unfair advantage in structuring collective
social understandings,” while disfavored groups have limited access to
contributing their perspectives.180 Exclusion of the perspectives of the
marginalized groups depletes conceptual resources necessary for public
life and policy development.
Understanding what prison is like is partially a hermeneutical project.
Prison can be described objectively, but the experience of incarceration
involves more than that. Exclusion of incarcerated people’s voices
removes them from the hermeneutical project of defining collective
meanings of punishment, including understanding the severity of
punishment.
To reiterate, epistemic injustice exists when someone is not seen as
competent or credible to provide information (testimonial injustice), or
is not able to contribute to a collective understanding of the meaning of
things (hermeneutical injustice). In both instances, the exclusion is
based on the person’s identity as a member of a disfavored social group.
Both testimonial and hermeneutical injustices act as an “obstacle to
truth.”181 The hearer misses the opportunity to learn the information
the speaker provides or, on a structural level, information and ideas are
“blocked” from circulation.182 This kind of harm affects our ability to
gain knowledge. The basic epistemic requirement for any society is the
ability to gather and retain knowledge about facts that impact its
survival: what is safe, what is dangerous, and so forth.183 So, the first
epistemic need of any society is the need to pool true information.184 If
the society is unjustifiably prejudiced against certain speakers, their bias
will result in a reduction in collective knowledge that may be necessary
for social and political life.185
A paucity of knowledge can have fatal consequences. Consider, for
example, the epistemic harm caused by a failure of officials at a local jail
178 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 15 (David E. Ling ed.
& trans., 1976).
179 See FRICKER, supra note 25, at 147-48.
180 Id. at 147.
181 See id. at 43.
182 See id. at 54-55. For additional arguments about the harm of testimonial injustice
not directly relevant to this Article, see, for example, id. at 46, 133, 145.
183 See id. at 109-10 (citing BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY
IN GENEALOGY (2002)).
184 See id. at 109.
185 See id. at 115-17; see also MEDINA, supra note 141, at 121 (discussing how
epistemic failures may often be simultaneously ethical and political failures).
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to respond to detainees’ medical complaints.186 One study analyzes the
death of a detainee in a local jail after the detainee’s medical complaints
went completely unheeded by the jail’s administration.187 This type of
“epistemic neglect” occurs when the listener’s uptake of the detainees’
speech is either distorted (the guards do not believe the complaints) or
where the detainee finds no effective method to speak to the
authorities.188
The medical neglect study revealed that thousands of detainee
grievances went completely unanswered.189 The structure and
orientation of the jail administration rendered it almost impossible for
jail authorities to listen and accurately understand prisoner accounts of
medical need.190 The obvious epistemic harm was that the jail
authorities did not know enough to intervene and save the lives of
detainees needing medical attention, or to address adequately other
systemic issues affecting detainee well-being in the jail. Similar forms of
epistemic harm occur when information about prison’s cruelties is
ignored or discredited in punishment decisions.
Hermeneutical and testimonial injustice can reinforce one another.191
To give another example, it is a hermeneutical injustice when
lawmakers have no idea what male prison is like for a transgender
woman because the lawmakers have no exposure to transgender people
who have been incarcerated.192 It is a testimonial injustice when
lawmakers discredit or ignore the accounts of imprisonment provided
by incarcerated transgender people in memoirs and legislative
186 José Medina, Agential Epistemic Injustice and Collective Epistemic Resistance in the
Criminal Justice System, SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 3-4 (2020) [hereinafter Agential Epistemic
Injustice].
187 Id. (citing José Medina & Matt S. Whitt, Epistemic Activism and the Politics of
Credibility: Testimonial Injustice Inside/Outside a North Carolina Jail, in MAKING THE CASE:
FEMINIST AND CRITICAL RACE THEORISTS INVESTIGATE CASE STUDIES (Heidi Grasswick &
Nancy McHugh eds.) (forthcoming)).
188 Id. at 5. It has also been called “pre-emptive testimonial injustice.” FRICKER, supra
note 25, at 130.
189 See José Medina & Matt S. Whitt, Epistemic Activism and the Politics of Credibility:
Testimonial Injustice Inside/Outside a North Carolina Jail, in MAKING THE CASE: FEMINIST
AND CRITICAL RACE THEORISTS INVESTIGATE CASE STUDIES 27 (Heidi Grasswick & Nancy
McHugh eds.) (forthcoming).
190 See Medina, Agential Epistemic Injustice, supra note 186, at 5-7 (citing Jennifer
Hornsby & Rae Langton, Free Speech and Illocution, 4 LEGAL THEORY 21 (1998)).
191 See FRICKER, supra note 25, at 159.
192 See generally Talia Mae Bettcher, Trans Identities and First-Person Authority, in
“YOU’VE CHANGED”: SEX REASSIGNMENT AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 98 (Laurie J. Shrage ed.,
2009) (discussing how transgender people have first-person authority over their own
gender).

2020]

Invisible Prisons

1219

testimony.193 In this way, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are
mutually reinforcing.
Assume, for a moment, that these twin injustices are always going on
in the background for incarcerated people — the hermeneutical and
testimonial injustice in relation to the dominant understanding of the
punishment of prison. It now becomes easier to see how we can have a
public debate about sentencing policy without ever mentioning what
prison is like. The people who would share that information are
excluded from the process.194
B. Hidden Punishment’s Open Secrets
Epistemic injustice that silences or discredits incarcerated people’s
accounts of prison adds a layer of secrecy to an already obscured system
of punishment. To illustrate the relationship between silencing and
secrecy, I draw an analogy to the use of paralytic agents in death penalty
protocols.
In their article about secrecy and lethal injection protocols, William
Berry and Meghan Ryan argue that the death penalty is shrouded from
public view (and thus democratic debate) by three levels of secrecy.195
First, the executions happen behind prison walls.196 Second, the
protocols for execution are not publicly available.197 Third, the paralytic
agent masks the suffering of the condemned who — prevented from
moving any muscle — cannot express in words or actions his
suffering.198 As a result, the subjective pain experienced in execution

193 See, e.g., Elliot Oberholtzer, The Dismal State of Transgender Incarceration Policies,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/
11/08/transgender/ [https://perma.cc/GP88-6B5J] (detailing the paucity of state laws
and policies addressing the needs of transgender prisoners).
194 Cf. Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., Varieties of Epistemic Injustice, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 13 (describing how specific
“knowers” have been excluded as “knowers”).
195 See William W. Berry III & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 435-36 (2017).
196 Id. at 423 (explaining that executions are “private affairs” conducted within the
prison).
197 See id. at 422-23.
198 Id. (citing Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 55-56 (2007)) (describing how
the paralytic drug functions “to prevent the offender from screaming and writhing as
the state pumps lethal drugs into his veins”).
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remains wholly unknowable.199 The defendant is completely silenced by
the paralytic agent and then by death.
These three levels of secrecy apply to prison as a punishment. It
occurs behind walls and its protocols and techniques are, while
sometimes publicly available in the form of agency regulations, often
obscured from view.200 In the words of eighteenth century British prison
reformer John Howard, “In prison, the awe of the public eye is lost, and
the power of the law is spent . . . .”201 This presents a problem for
evaluating our sentencing practices and policy. “If the people cannot
see what happens to those who are thrown into the criminal justice
system, they cannot be expected to restrain its tendency toward
excess.”202
Berry and Ryan’s third type of secrecy, silencing the condemned with
paralytic agents, can be analogized to epistemic injustice. To be sure,
unlike executed prisoners, imprisoned people are still alive and able to
communicate their experiences. They are not, however, credited when
they speak. The barrier to being heard when they speak about their
prison experiences is a third level of secrecy, a critical aspect of the
invisibility in prisons.
We can see the mechanisms of epistemic injustice at work in the
recent discovery of beatings and unexplained deaths in Florida’s Dozier
School for Boys, which was in operation as a juvenile detention facility
from 1905 to 2011.203 On the outside, it appeared to be a progressive
reformatory school with lawns, educational programming, and few
locked doors. But the actual experience of the incarcerated boys was
much different and included horrible beatings from the guards under
199 Id. at 424 (citing Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional
Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 265 (2009)); Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal
Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
49, 55-56 (2007).
200 Foucault described how the spectacle of the scaffold was replaced with the
enclosed space of the prison. See FOUCAULT, supra note 122, at 34, 115-16.
201 HOWARD, supra note 19, at 24.
202 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Cruel, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 448 (2017)
(citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 155 (2002)) (“The
notion of hiding punishment from public view would have seemed vaguely tyrannical
in the late eighteenth century . . . .”); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 75 (1993) (“In the nineteenth century, corrections
went private. The walled-off penitentiary replaced the pillory and the whipping post;
and most states abolished the public festival of hanging.”).
203 See Erin Blakemore, Archaeologists Finally Know What Happened at This Brutal
Reform School, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.
com/smart-news/archaeologists-finally-know-what-happened-brutal-reform-school180957911/ [https://perma.cc/UC7B-3JTC].
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cover of darkness, sexual abuse, and mysterious disappearances of boys.
Several years ago, the remains of fifty-one boys were uncovered on the
Dozier grounds,204 triggering an inquiry into how they died and the
actual conditions of confinement at the school.205
While investigative reports and testimonials surfaced on conditions
at Dozier from 1903 to the early 2000s,206 few formerly incarcerated
boys spoke about their experiences publicly until the graves were
discovered. After the graves were discovered, a group of Dozier
survivors spoke up, identifying themselves as the “white house boys”
because the building where many of the night beatings took place was
called the “white house.”207 One recalled the white house as follows:
. . . blood on the walls, bits of lip or tongue on the pillow, the
smell of urine and whiskey, the way the bed springs sang with
each blow. The way they cried out for Jesus or mama. The
grinding of the old fan that muffled their cries. The one-armed
man who swung the strap.208
Certainly such violent abuse would lead some boys to fear retaliation
should they tell anyone what was happening at Dozier. Indeed, one
newspaper article about the Dozier school claims that “outsiders had no
idea” what was happening at Dozier.209 Yet, it is also the true that Dozier
was the subject of prior investigations, and many boys left Dozier,
carrying their experiences of abuse with them.210 How, then, did the
boys’ accounts of abuse remain so hidden from public view?

204

Id.
Elizabeth Koh, Entire Dozier School Campus Will Be Searched for Graves, State
Officials Say, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 20, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/
florida-politics/buzz/2019/06/20/entire-dozier-school-campus-will-be-searchedfor-graves-state-officials-say/ [https://perma.cc/7VJ5-M8EX]; see ERIN H. KIMMERLE,
E. CHRISTIAN WELLS & ANTOINETTE JACKSON, FLA. INST. FOR FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY
& APPLIED SCIS., U.S. FLA. REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATHS AND
BURIALS AT THE FORMER ARTHUR G. DOZIER SCHOOL FOR BOYS IN MARIANNA, FLORIDA
(Jan. 18, 2016), http://news.usf.edu/article/articlefiles/7173-usf-final-dozier-summary2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2PT-LEYW].
206 See Ben Montgomery & Waveney Ann Moore, For Their Own Good, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Apr. 19, 2009), https://dartcenter.org/sites/default/files/For_Their_
Own_Good_reduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HEY-KVFL].
207 Greg Allen, Florida’s Dozier School for Boys: A True Horror Story, NPR (Oct. 15,
2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/10/15/162941770/floridas-dozier-school-for-boys-atrue-horror-story [https://perma.cc/EET5-EMN8].
208 Montgomery & Moore, supra note 206.
209 Id. at 3E.
210 See id. at 6A.
205
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The absence of incarcerated voices from public discussions of Dozier
prior to the discovery of the graves demonstrates how epistemic
injustice can lead to systemic violence. Those seeking to commit
violence do not fear reprisal because their victims will not be heard or
believed.211 “[T]o communicate, we all need an audience willing and
capable of hearing us.”212 Instead, there may be a “willful hermeneutical
injustice” in which the prisoners of the boys’ reformatory clearly
attempt to inform others about their conditions of confinement, but the
people who could do something to change the situation “continue to
misunderstand and misinterpret” what the reformatory is really doing
to the boys.213 They insist that it is an educational facility rather than a
site of torture, neglect, and even murder. Critically, the boys —
members of the disfavored group of juvenile delinquents — were not
an active part of the public conversations about the Dozier school until
objective evidence of its abuses emerged: the discovery of hidden graves
containing the remains of boys. Then, a groundswell of former Dozier
inmates coming forward to tell their stories.
To conclude this Part, epistemic injustice occurs when disfavored
groups do not have the opportunity to share information or are
disbelieved when they attempt to share information. The exclusion of
their voices creates gaps in public knowledge. These knowledge gaps
have been called hermeneutical lacunas — areas of the social world
which are fundamentally misunderstood, areas lacking adequate
meaning.214 Prison-as-experienced, I argue, is one such area. While
exclusion or discrediting of the voices of incarcerated people may occur
on an unconscious level, it is also due to structural power arrangements
that discourage attention to information that challenge the prevailing
world view.215 As the Dozier school history illustrates, the result is a
visible prison on top of an invisible prison. Efforts to integrate
knowledge about the cruelties and abuses of the invisible prison can

211 See, e.g., HEATHER ANN THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON
UPRISING AND ITS LEGACY 249-54 (2016) (documenting how abuse of prisoners
continued with impunity after the 1971 Attica uprising, in part because so few observers
were permitted inside to interview prisoners).
212 Kristie Dotson, Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing, 26
HYPATIA 236, 238 (2011).
213 See Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a
Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance, 27 HYPATIA 715, 716 (2012) (emphasis
omitted).
214 See FRICKER, supra note 25, at 158-59.
215 See infra Part III for a discussion on responsible listening.
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take decades — even a century. As one incarcerated journalist puts it,
“The walls are thicker than you think.”216
In the final Part, I discuss what can be done about epistemic injustice
towards incarcerated people and its impact on sentencing policy and
practice.
III. EPISTEMIC VIRTUE IN SENTENCING DECISIONS
Given the ethical and epistemological value of first-person
knowledge, the voices of incarcerated people are paramount to
understanding the qualitative experience of imprisonment. To say that
incarcerated voices are paramount is not to say that other sources are
illegitimate. To be sure, other methods of inquiry can increase collective
knowledge about the qualitative experience of imprisonment. The
Guardian, for example, created a virtual-reality experience of solitary
confinement that the viewer can experience using a headset and her
phone.217 This permits the viewer to have a visceral, sensory experience
rather than just an intellectual understanding. Moreover, various people
affiliated with prisons and prisoners have some insight into prison’s
cruelties. Guards and journalists posing as guards, for example, have
shared insights about prison-as-experienced.218 Both governmental and
non-governmental actors tour prison facilities with an eye toward
monitoring conditions.219 Researchers study prison conditions and
qualitative differences between prisons.220

216

Nightline, supra note 27.
6x9: A Virtual Experience of Solitary Confinement, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/ng-interactive/2016/apr/27/6x9-a-virtual-experience-of-solitary-confinement
(last visited Mar. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/QY5V-QTEA]. Likewise, the Prison and Justice
Initiative at Georgetown University installed a replica of a solitary confinement cell that
visitors can sit in for up to thirty minutes. Replica Solitary Confinement Cell Exhibit, GEO.
PRISONS & JUST. INITIATIVE, https://prisonsandjustice.georgetown.edu/solitarycellreplica
exhibit (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/THN2-RRPY].
218 See, e.g., SHAUN BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON: A REPORTER’S UNDERCOVER JOURNEY INTO
THE BUSINESS OF PUNISHMENT (2018) (illustrating an account of a journalist posing as a
prison guard in Louisiana).
219 See, e.g., Who We Are, CORRECTIONAL ASS’N OF N.Y., https://www.correctional
association.org/about-cany (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BT88-2PLM]
(describing the mandate of the association to provide independent monitoring of New
York prisons).
220 See, for example, Alison Liebling’s large body of work grading prisons’ “moral
performance” and effect on incarcerated people. ALISON LIEBLING, PRISONS AND THEIR
MORAL PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF VALUES, QUALITY, AND PRISON LIFE (2004); THE
EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT (Alison Liebling & Shadd Maruna eds., 2005).
217
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Yet, non-prisoner sources of information about prison-asexperienced present an ethical challenge because they risk discounting
prisoners’ ability to provide authoritative information. Incarcerated
people are thus treated as objects of study rather than producers of
knowledge.221 It is largely unobjectionable to be studied if one can also
speak and be heard about one’s experiences, thereby contributing to the
study.222 The problem arises when one is studied but not permitted to
share knowledge. Fricker compares the silenced, studied person to a
tree felled in the forest.223 We can study the rings to know its age, but
as an object incapable of agency, the tree does not produce
knowledge.224 Likewise, a prisoner and his conditions can be studied —
making him the source of information.225 This is very different from
speaking on one’s own behalf. The ethical harm then, is to treat
someone not like an informant, but merely as a source of information.226
Further, non-prisoner sources present epistemic challenges in their
potential inaccuracy. Non-prisoner accounts of prison, as well as visits
to prisons, often present sanitized, ideal versions of the prison
experience.227 At the same time, non-prisoner accounts of prison also

221

See FRICKER, supra note 25, at 132.
See id. at 133-34. Fricker cites to Martha Nussbaum for the proposition that
objectification is only a problem in the Kantian sense, when one is solely the means to
an end and not also a subject capable of agency. Id. at 133 (citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 214 (1999)). Moreover, excluding the voice of prisoners from
debates about prison as punishment has implications for democratic values and antisubordination theory. Both anti-subordination theory and democratic values, although
different, share this non-utilitarian view of the value of including the voices of
incarcerated people in the discussion of criminal justice reform. See, e.g., Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURE (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) (discussing antisubordination theory); Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to
Democracy, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 252-57 (2004) (describing many ways
that incarceration silences inmates).
223 FRICKER, supra note 25, at 132-33.
224 See FRANZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 109 (Charles Lam Markmann trans.,
Grove Press 1967) (1952) (noting as Franz Fanon puts it so well, “I came into the world
imbued with the will to find a meaning in things . . . and then I found that I was an
object in the midst of other objects”).
225 See, e.g., GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON (1958) (sharing the findings from a study of prisoners in maximum
security prisons).
226 FRICKER, supra note 25, at 132; see Talia Mae Bettcher, Trans Identities and FirstPerson Authority, in YOU’VE CHANGED: SEX REASSIGNMENT AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 98, 113
(Laurie J. Shrage ed., 2009) (discussing the idea that observers from a dominant group
can never accurately communicate the experience of the “resistant” group).
227 See supra Part II.B, for discussion of the Dozier School for Boys.
222
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run the risk of conflating fantasy with reality. Prisons feature
prominently in the American imagination,228 existing in both
mythology and materiality.229 Innumerable television shows, movies,
and novels are set in prisons. As Angela Y. Davis pointed out in her
seminal abolitionist work, Are Prisons Obsolete?, everyone who watched
the prison show “Oz” thought they knew exactly what prison was
like.230 One risks replacing an understanding of prison-as-experienced
with, for example, a mythic idea of a hero trapped in a gothic hell.231
The gothic imaginary excites, and, in the context of the story, it often
seems that the other prisoners are so profoundly violent that they
certainly belong there.232
It follows then that, for both ethical and epistemic reasons, sources of
information about the experience of imprisonment should privilege
first-person accounts of incarceration with an eye toward
understanding general themes about the qualities of incarceration and
their variables, rather than privileging sensational narratives. Including
voices of incarcerated people in the project of understanding prison-asexperienced requires at least three predicates: (1) the proper epistemic
approach to listening; (2) a way for incarcerated people to participate
directly in conversations and meaning-making about punishment; and
(3) attention to publications of incarcerated people.
Below I briefly discuss responsible listening as an epistemic virtue
while noting the challenges posed by unconscious biases, structural
oppression, and empathy deficits. I then discuss political and social
methods for incarcerated people to participate in shaping a collective
understanding of the punishment of imprisonment. I argue that
prisoner participation in sentencing policy should have an iterative
component in which incarcerated people are directly in dialogue with
policymakers as well as a reflective or artistic component, in which
attention is paid to the writing of incarcerated people describing their
experiences.
228

See SMITH, supra note 1, at 23.
PHILLIP SMITH, PUNISHMENT AND CULTURE 59 (2008).
230 DAVIS, supra note 2, at 18.
231 See Norman Mailer, Introduction to JACK HENRY ABBOT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST
ix, xiii (1981) (indicating that Norman Mailer seems to characterize Jack Henry Abbott
this way in his introduction to Abbott’s prison memoirs: “It is that not only are the worst
of the young sent to prison, but the best - that is, the proudest, the bravest, the most
daring, the most enterprising, and the most undefeated of the poor”).
232 See, e.g., Bill Yousman, Inside Oz: Hyperviolence, Race and Class Nightmares, and
the Engrossing Spectacle of Terror, 6 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 265, 265 (2009)
(arguing that “Oz’s hyperviolent spectacle legitimizes both the expansion of the prisonindustrial complex and the continuing prevalence of inhumane prison environments”).
229
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Finally, I address heterogeneity in prison experiences from epistemic
and practical perspectives. Although variation makes it more difficult to
arrive at a generalized understanding of prison’s cruelties, the
heterogeneity does not present more of a challenge than in other areas
of social knowledge. Sentencing policy and practice can find a way
forward through the variations in prison experiences by taking into
account the worst that prison has to offer when making sentencing
decisions. In other words, to the extent that experiences of prison
conditions are varied, sentencing policy and practice decisions should
be made in light of the worst known conditions. This presumption of
the worst accords with a non-ideal theory of injustice, in which injustice
is understood as the norm rather than a “surprising abnormality.”233 If
prison’s cruelties are the norm, they should not be treated as aberrations
in sentencing decisions.
A. Responsible Listening
Rather than identifying what to listen to and whom to believe,
epistemic injustice theorists suggest a general approach of cultivating
the virtue of responsible listening.234 Framed in Aristotelian terms,
responsible listening can be seen as a habit that one can cultivate in the
pursuit of knowledge.235 Listening carefully to incarcerated people
describe their prison experiences respects them as people with critical
knowledge to contribute, knowledge that is otherwise inaccessible.236
The difficulty that presents itself, however, is how the listener can
think critically about the credibility and competence of the information
provided without bias or ideological commitments that denigrate the

233 MEDINA, supra note 141, at 13 (citing SHKLAR, supra note 28, at 17) (“This normal
model of justice does not ignore injustice but it does tend to reduce it to a prelude to or
a rejection and breakdown of justice, as if injustice were a surprising abnormality.”);
see also FRICKER, supra note 25, at 39 (arguing that “testimonial injustice is a normal
part of discursive life”); SHKLAR, supra note 28, at 19 (“Most injustices occur
continuously within the framework of an established polity with an operative system of
law, in normal times.”). Elsewhere, Elizabeth Anderson writes of her book, “This is a
work in nonideal theory. I do not advance principles and ideals for a perfectly just
society, but ones that we need to cope with the injustices in our current world, and to
move us to something better.” ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 3
(2010).
234 See MEDINA, supra note 141, at 30.
235 See FRICKER, supra note 25, at 81 (discussing how Aristotle’s idea of “moral
training” applies to epistemically virtuous listening).
236 See CHARLES MILLS, BLACKNESS VISIBLE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 27 (1998)
(discussing the epistemic significance of “experiential space”).
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information or the informer.237 Recommendations offered by epistemic
theorists for how to do this seem at once obvious and inadequate.
Medina, for example, cautions against familiar barriers to learning like
“underestimat[ing one’s] cognitive gaps and limitations,”238 and
resisting “experiences and viewpoints that can destabilize (or create
trouble for) one’s own perspective.”239 The remedy, according to
Medina, involves adhering to the three epistemic virtues of humility,
“curiosity/diligence,” and “open-mindedness.”240 These are worthy
goals, to be sure. Given the barriers of implicit biases, power
relationships, and empathy deficits, however, it is not clear whether
responsible listening can be achieved. As I discuss in a prior article,
much of the prejudice against disfavored groups occurs unconsciously
because of implicit biases that are not easy to dislodge.241 Even if the
ideological exclusion of contrary information is not intentional,
information which contradicts the dominant ideology may be
discredited or ignored because it seems incoherent to the dominant
ideology.242 Moreover, those in positions of power may not want to
learn information that challenges existing ideologies and practices.243 In
these instances, there is no shared commitment to the idea of collective
knowledge that can be improved by adding voices previously silenced
or discredited.244
A related impediment to listening is lack of empathy, defined as the
emotional element that “helps us decide what is important, [] moves us
to action, and [] helps us to care about the consequences of our

237 See MEDINA, supra note 141, at 127 (suggesting that, at a minimum, responsible
agency in relation to knowledge requires three things: self-knowledge, social
knowledge, and empirical knowledge about the world).
238 Id. at 57.
239 Id. at 35.
240 Id. at 42-44.
241 See Hanan, supra note 63, at 307. Instead of unconscious bias, Fricker describes
the process as judgments that are not “doxastically mediated.” See FRICKER, supra note
25, at 36-37, 40 (“[S]tereotypical images held in the collective social imagination . . .
can operate beneath the radar of our ordinary doxastic self-scrutiny, sometimes even
despite beliefs to the contrary.”).
242 See Charles W. Mills, Ideology, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 107.
243 See id. (“So the idea of common epistemic resources would in this case understate
the adversarial dynamic and conflicting group interests involved, and obscure the fact that
the subordinate black worldview . . . cannot simply be brought additively into relation
with the ideology of white domination, since it is in fundamental opposition to it.”).
244 See id. at 108.
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decisions.”245 A minimal level of empathy in the form of general interest
is necessary to motivate learning.246 Without interest, one does not
inquire or listen.
A lack of empathy for prisoners is well documented. Remember the
Nightline episode described in the introduction in which people called
in to the show to say, “To hell with these people [in prison]” while Chief
Justice Berger argued for lawmakers to visit prisons and talk to
prisoners.247 It is as if, by virtue of the crime, one assumes the risk of
anything that might befall one in prison. John Howard noted this
objection to his frank report on the inhumane prison conditions in
England and Wales in the late eighteenth century:
Those gentlemen who, when they are told of the misery which
our prisoners suffer, content themselves with saying, Let them
take care to keep out . . . forget the vicissitudes of human affairs;
the unexpected changes to which all men are liable; and that
those whose circumstances are affluent, may in time be reduced
to indigence, and become debtors and prisoners.248
In this passage, Howard attempts to engender empathy for prisoners by
arguing that fate could land anyone in circumstances leading to
incarceration.249 Yet, it can be difficult to imagine oneself as a prisoner
if one accepts the dominant characterization of incarcerated people as
inherently different because of their criminality.250 The mark of

245 Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 18 (2011).
While folk understanding may continue to separate emotional and cognitive thought, a
body of evidence suggests that emotions play a role in cognition, and cognition plays a
role in feeling. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2044 (2010) (summarizing literature on emotion-cognition
mixed process).
246 See Judith M. Harackiewicz, Jessi L. Smith & Stacy J. Priniski, Interest Matters:
The Importance of Promoting Interest in Education, 3 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN
SCI. 220, 220 (2016).
247 Nightline, supra note 27.
248 HOWARD, supra note 19, at 15 (emphasis in original).
249 See generally id. at 22 (describing how in 1776, over 4,000 people were
incarcerated in England as “felons,” “petty offenders,” or “debtors”).
250 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 941 (2016)
(“Implicit in American punishment is the idea that serious or repeat offenses mark the
offenders as morally deformed people rather than ordinary people who have committed
crimes.”). The lack of interest in prisoners does not perfectly track the designation of
the person as criminal. Pretrial detainees who have been convicted of no crime, as well
as people who have been convicted of minor crimes, are subject to similar social
disinterest even though it has not been established that they did anything to merit harsh
treatment. See Dolovich, Cruelty, supra note 18, at 919.
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criminality justifies all manner of harsh treatment and exclusion from
participation in society.251 The idea that their punishment is justified
seems to negate empathy.
At the same time, some people — particularly wealthy, white
defendants — draw public empathy even if convicted of serious
crimes.252 Critical race scholars and others studying racial disparities in
the criminal legal system argue that the notorious harshness of
punishment in American prisons has antecedents in slavery and
manifests in post-slavery practices like convict leasing and
segregation.253 As a result, empathy emerges only when those racebased punishment techniques are applied to white, wealthy
defendants.254
For the sentencing authority seeking to overcome these barriers,
perhaps we can at least say that they should commit to seeking out firsthand information in order to educate themselves about any area of the
social world over which they have responsibility yet little direct
experience. Even if we are not aware of our unconscious processes, we
can remind ourselves of what we need to know to make responsible
decisions.255 Moreover, because they have the power to punish,
sentencing authorities should be subject to “heightened epistemic
responsibility” to ensure that they exercise their power wisely.256 Given
the barriers described above, however, encouragement to listen
responsibility will not be enough to ensure that incarcerated voices are
heard. The below sections address inclusion of incarcerated voices in
sentencing policy.
B. Incarcerated Voices in Punishment Decisions
1.

Participation in Sentencing Policy and Practice

Sustained political participation of incarcerated people in sentencing
policy facilitates democratic accountability for our punishment
251 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 19 (2003).
252 There are certainly exceptions, like the Manafort sentencing debate described
supra Part I.A.
253 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16-18 (2012); DAVIS, supra note 2, at 28-29.
254 I thank Malcolm Feeley for pointing out the relevance of this to my argument.
255 Medina calls this a “thesis of cognitive minimums” about the social knowledge
of others and the empirical world. MEDINA, supra note 141, at 127, 131 (noting that
cognitive minimums are specific to context).
256 See id. at 127.
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practices.257 It weds the twin concerns of ethical and epistemic injustice
by engaging the people most affected by sentencing laws in sentencing.
Consider, for example, the birth of KRUM, a prisoner organization in
Scandinavia that sparked criminal justice reform.258 In the 1960s
Scandinavian prisoners convened a “Parliament of Thieves,” which
“told the public and the press what life in prison was like.”259
Importantly, the engagement of prisoners in political and social
discussions of criminal legal reform developed into the establishment of
a more permanent organization — KRUM, which influenced changes in
criminal law and prison administration, including limiting sentence
lengths and improving prison conditions.260
Political participation of incarcerated people is already happening in
the U.S. As mentioned in the Introduction, some formerly incarcerated
people practice as attorneys,261 and serve as our academic colleagues in
law,262 as well as in the social sciences.263 Formerly incarcerated people
often testify before legislative bodies about criminal justice issues. For
example, Cynthia Shank, formerly incarcerated in federal prison before
receiving clemency during the Obama Administration, and Piper
Kerman, author of the prison memoir, Orange is the New Black, testified
before a U.S. Congressional Committee about women in prison.264

257 Recent scholarship emphasizes the role of activism in revitalizing the role of the
public in criminal legal practices. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of “The
People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 256-57 (2019) (discussing
“communal contestation” of criminal legal practices from the family and community of
the defendant, who can also be seen as “the people” the prosecution should represent);
see also Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 352, 356-57 (2015) (describing how the Movement for Black Lives
presents a democratically-driven challenge to policing and incarceration).
258 McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence, supra note 152, at 121-22.
259 Id. at 122 (citation excluded).
260 Id. (discussing Norway’s Bastoy Prison Island where prisoners “grow their own
food [and] live in humane conditions with access to education, work and skills
training”).
261 See, e.g., Innocence Staff, supra note 10.
262 See, e.g., GEO. LAW, supra note 11.
263 See, e.g., Richards & Ross, supra note 12.
264 Women in the Criminal Justice System, supra note 43, at 26.08 (noting as Ms.
Kerman states, “[o]ur experiences are essential to understanding the reform that’s
needed in the system”); id. at 44.40 (including testimony of Cynthia Shank, former
federal prisoner granted clemency by the Obama Administration, about being separated
from her children and husband); id. at 56.42 (indicating that Kerman shows the
Committee a video clip from Orange is the New Black, depicting a woman who had just
given birth returning to prison without her child, which Representative Jerrold Nadler
referred to as a “heart-wrenching moment”).
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It is, admittedly, easier for formerly incarcerated people to speak to
the public than it is for people who are still in prison. Prison policy
deliberately limits communication between prisoners and the outside
world.265 While prisons may have legitimate reasons for banning cell
phones, for example, the policy leaves incarcerated people unable to
create any photographs or videography to document prison conditions.
Scott Whitney, incarcerated at the Marin Correctional Facility in
Florida, spent four years creating a documentary about life inside the
prison using a contraband video recorder hidden in his glasses and
inside a Bible that he carried close to his chest.266 Some clips from his
documentary, titled Behind Tha Barb Wire, were obtained by the Miami
Herald.267 As far as I can tell, however, the complete documentary was
never released. Scott Whitney faced additional charges and his
documentary was suppressed.268 While security concerns motivate
some restrictions on cameras in prison, the incident highlights the
difficulty prisoners have documenting and sharing their prison
experiences.
Similarly, prison newspapers, with a few notable exceptions like the
Angolite published from Louisiana State Penitentiary, have faced
censorship challenges limiting the amount the journalists reveal about
conditions of confinement.269 U.S. prison journalism emerged out of a
debtors’ prison in New York City in 1800, with the express purpose of
educating the public about the plight of imprisoned debtors.270
265 The seminal case of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) held that prison
regulations burdening prisoners’ First Amendment rights of association and speech will
be upheld if the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Id. at 89.
266 Romy Ellenbogen, Bootleg Film Shows Florida Prison in All Its Danger, Squalor. An
Inmate Shot It on the Sly, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/special-reports/florida-prisons/article235623292.html [https://perma.cc/PZ4M-XP68].
267 Id.
268 Deanna Paul, An Inmate’s Secretly Recorded Film Shows the Gruesome Reality of
Life in Prison, WASH. POST (OCT. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2019/10/07/an-inmates-secretly-recorded-film-shows-gruesome-reality-life-prison/
[https://perma.cc/ET5S-E27U].
269 See RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 112-13 (offering a first-person account of how a
prison journalist for The Angolite surmounted the prison’s culture of institutional
censorship).
270 See, e.g., JAMES MCGRATH MORRIS, JAILHOUSE JOURNALISM: THE FOURTH ESTATE
BEHIND BARS 19-23 (1998) (discussing how in the service of ending debtors’ prisons, the
prison newspapers sometimes used humor, like its faux correspondence between
mother and son: “Dear Son, I am in Jail . . .”; “Dear Mother, God Help you, so am I”).
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s imprisoned son, Julian, wrote poems and prose for a prison
newspaper, GOOD WORDS, out of the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary and under the byline
No. 4435. Id. at 76-77. His prison poems were also published in the New York Times
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However, due to institutional censorship, prison newspapers often
distorted prison experiences rather than revealing them.271
Other structural barriers block communication from prison. Many
prisoners do not have access to the tools needed for sharing their ideas
with the outside world. Computer access is limited, and even stamps
must be purchased from commissary. Not all prisoners attained
education levels that permit them to give a descriptive, written account
of their experience.272 While some incarcerated people write about their
experiences in prison,273 others have inadequate access to educational
opportunities in which to cultivate writing and other communication
skills, and inadequate access to education programs.274
Moreover, living in prison can require a singular focus on learning
and following the rules of survival.275 This, combined with lack of
and Washington Post. Hawthorne labeled the scourge of prison life (in addition to
dehumanization and violence) as “aimlessness,” which he viewed as a step on the road
to “insanity.” Id. at 79-80 (quoting Julian Hawthorne, Good Words (Oct. 1, 1913)).
Julian Hawthorne’s other targets were the continued use of gratuitous violence by some
prison officials, conditions that were officially denied at the time, but which were
corroborated through first-person accounts. Id. (noting Justice Department records
corroborating the use of shackled solitary confinement, which Hawthorne alleged, and
the prison denied).
271 See id. at 54 (describing how papers of its ilk during the reformatory era were
carefully edited and directed by prison officials, to the extent that the reader might think
that “prison life was often pleasant, invigorating, and improving”); see, e.g., id. at 38-41
(describing a newspaper published by prisoners in the Elmira Reformatory in New York
in the 1880s took an upbeat tone toward the prospects of rehabilitation and championed
the reformatory’s successes).
272 Many incarcerated people test at grade-school levels for literacy, which may limit
their ability to adequately convey their experience in the written word. See Thomas C.
O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 310, 310 n.75
(2006) (noting grade school-level language skills for the majority of state prisoners);
see also Jessica Feierman, The Power of the Pen: Jailhouse Lawyers, Literacy, and Civic
Engagement, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 369, 372 (2006) (noting that 14% of federal
prisoners did not complete eighth grade).
273 Discussed infra Part III.B.2.
274 See LoCi & Wittenberg University Writing Group, An Epistemology of
Incarceration: Constructing Knowledge on the Inside, 6 PHILOSOPHIA 9, 14 (2016)
(describing limited opportunities for intellectual growth in Ohio prisons).
275 See id. at 10-11 (noting that institutional and social aspects of prison life
discourage epistemic engagement, but that prisoners also have a unique vantage point
from which to analyze prison and punishment practices); see also Patricia Hill Collins,
The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y
745, 759 (1989) (arguing that marginalized groups often develop a heightened
awareness of both their circumstances and the views that dominate public life); Vivian
M. May, “Speaking into the Void”? Intersectionality Critiques and Epistemic Backlash, 29
HYPATIA 94, 98 (2014) (same); Mills, supra note 242, at 107-08 (same).
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accesses to the necessary resources, can inhibit incarcerated people
from attending to and communicating what they know.276 Faced with
difficulty drawing attention to prison conditions, prisoners periodically
resort to strikes, like the nationwide strike of 2018.277 Strikes can be
seen as last-resort efforts to communicate about intolerable prison
conditions.
Successful participation of incarcerated people in sentencing policy
requires coordinating with allies outside of prison who can facilitate
communication.278 For example, the First Five Grieving Committee at
a local jail in Ohio originated as a group of detainees who organized to
bring conditions at the jail to the attention of the local community and
its leaders.279 Outsiders allied with the First Five Grieving Committee
to read detainee letters aloud at city council and county commission
meetings, and arranged to have the detainee letters published online
and in local print media.280 People who are not incarcerated can thus
assist incarcerated people who are trying to participate in public
discourse. Without outside help, prisoner participation in public spaces
often faces insurmountable barriers.
2.

Writing from Prison

The writing of incarcerated people merits separate attention because
of its unique epistemic function. Written accounts of prison often
contain emotional richness that is difficult to find anywhere else except

276 See LoCi & Wittenberg University Writing Group, supra note 274, at 15 (quoting
FOUCUALT, supra note 122, at 136) (describing this process as “[t]he construction of
docile bodies, bodies ‘that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved’ for the
purposes of the institution”).
277 Prison strikes are quintessential efforts to draw attention to what is happening in
prison. The prison strikes of 2018 made ten demands, which included improved
conditions, access to rehabilitative services, and an end to slave labor. Prison Strike 2018,
INCARCERATED WORKERS ORG. COMM., https://incarceratedworkers.org/campaigns/
prison-strike-2018 (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6M37-WJB3]
(explaining how state prisoners receive an average of twenty cents an hour for their
labor, a significant grievance leading up to the nationwide prison strikes in 2016).
278 The abolitionist organization, Critical Resistance, for example, includes in its
mission “uplift[ing] and amplify[ing] the perspectives of those most targeted by the
prison industrial complex.” Prisoners Speak Out: Analysis and Perspectives, CRITICAL
RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/prisoneranalysis/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Y654-XD8S].
279 See Medina, Agential Epistemic Injustice, supra note 186, at 9-10.
280 Id. at 10. Medina notes that allies of imprisoned groups function to amplify
prisoner voices when they “lend their voices and epistemic agency as instruments or
extensions of the inmates’ own, without interpreting or translating . . . .” See id.
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perhaps in the visual arts.281 It is, of course, difficult to share traumatic
experiences, especially while living in an environment where survival
requires maintaining a certain amount of emotional numbness. Writing
provides a mechanism for expressing the emotional and traumatic
aspects of imprisonment.282 In the words of Toni Morrison:
Certain kinds of trauma visited on peoples are so deep, so cruel,
that unlike money, unlike vengeance, even unlike justice, or
rights, or the goodwill of others, only writers can translate such
trauma and turn sorrow into meaning, sharpening the moral
imagination.283
Incarcerated people have written and continue to write memoirs,
poetry, prose, and letters.284 These texts have been considered and
organized into a taxonomy by formerly incarcerated criminologists
studying the “insider perspective” sources: anthologies by prison
reform advocates, journalists’ accounts of prison life, prison journalism,
edited anthologies of prison writing, academic studies of prison life, and
prison memoirs.285

281 See, for example, Guantanamo Bay prisoner Abu Zubaydah’s drawings of torture.
Carol Rosenberg, What the C.I.A.’s Torture Program Looked Like to the Tortured, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/us/politics/cia-torturedrawings.html [perma.cc/5JEE-6CJS] (publishing some of prisoner’s drawings of his
torture).
282 This point was made by an incarcerated men’s writer’s group in Ohio, whose
experience writing provided a rare emotional outlet. See LoCi & Wittenberg University
Writing Group, supra note 274, at 13.
283 TONI MORRISON, THE SOURCE OF SELF-REGARD ix (2019).
284 See, e.g., BACA, supra note 8, at 8-9 (including a poet’s memoir of his time in
prison); RIDEAU, supra note 7 (including a formerly incarcerated man’s memoir of his
time in prison); ALBERT WOODFOX, SOLITARY (2019) (including a memoir by man who
spent four decades in prison).
285 Richards & Ross, supra note 12, at 179; see also id. at 182. While formerly
incarcerated scholars, such as John Irwin, have written about prisons and engaged in
activism, coupling heuristics with academic research, the discipline of convict
criminology was not established until 1997. See Greg Newbold, Jeffrey Ian Ross, Richard
S. Jones, Stephen C. Richards & Michael Lenza, Prison Research from the Inside: The Role
of Convict Autoethnography, 20 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 439, 442-43 (2014). Irwin served
five years for burglary, and later became a professor of sociology who “used his exconvict perspective to champion humanitarian correctional policies . . . .” Id. at 442.
The founders of convict criminology contend that the research conducted by nonconvicts “routinely disregards the harm perpetrated by criminal justice processing of
individuals arrested, charged, and convicted of crimes.” Richards & Ross, supra note
12, at 177.
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Prison memoirs provide insight and detail into prison-asexperienced.286 They represent a formidable counterweight to
objectification — and dehumanization — of the prisoner. Take, for
example, the writings of George Jackson, a member of the Black Panther
Party who was incarcerated in California’s prison system from 1961 to
1970, when he was killed by a prison guard.287 Many members of the
Black Panther Party were doubly objectified in the media as both
criminals and as Black radicals.288 Yet, Jackson’s letters reveal a young
man keenly aware of the damages prison was inflicting on him. He
wrote:
[Prison] destroys the logical processes of the mind, a man’s
thoughts become completely disorganized. The noise, madness
streaming from every throat, frustrated sounds from the bars,
metallic sounds from the walls, the steel trays, the iron beds
bolted to the wall, the hollow sounds from a cast-iron sink or
toilet.289
Jackson orients the reader to see him as a subject experiencing prison
rather than an object of state control. He later writes about the pain of
having not seen a night sky in ten years,290 and engages in many long
descriptions of his evolving political perspective.291 His letters thus
illustrate the way in which prison writing asserts the continued
existence and unique, subjective experience of its authors.
While few incarcerated people publish book-length memoirs, others
write shorter descriptions of their experiences, often in classes or
workshops within prisons.292 Projects like the LoCI writing group in
286 See e.g., BACA, supra note 8 (poet’s memoir detailing his time in prison); RIDEAU,
supra note 7 (detailing the author’s experiences while incarcerated); WOODFOX, supra
note 284 (detailing the author’s four decades in prison).
287 See GEORGE JACKSON, SOLEDAD BROTHER: THE PRISON LETTERS OF GEORGE JACKSON
x (1970).
288 See Judson L. Jeffries, Local News Coverage of the Black Panther Party: An Analysis
of the Baltimore, Cleveland, and New Orleans Press, 7 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 19, 34 (2004).
289 JACKSON, supra note 287, at 21.
290 Id. at 313.
291 See id. at 223 (critiquing non-violent resistance in letter to his attorney); id. at
292 (stating, “dialectical materialism is my bag” to Joan (described on p. 278 as a
member of the Soledad Defense Committee)); id. at 301 (asking Angela Davis to send
him books on Marxist political theory).
292 See generally History, Process, Mission, AM. PRISON WRITING ARCHIVE,
http://apw.dhinitiative.org/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U8QX-76PL]
(describing that the American Prison Writing Archive solicits and disseminates essays
from incarcerated persons in hopes to “ground national debate on mass incarceration
in the lived experience of those who know prisons best”).
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Ohio engage prisoners in written reflection to help them develop the
epistemic skills of “subversive lucidity” while incarcerated.293 One of
the founders of LoCI, Nancy Arden McHugh, describes her work
assisting in the creation of “epistemic communities” in prisons through
a prison-based writing group focused on the development of an
“epistemology of incarceration” in which “people make knowledge and
meaning for themselves.”294 It is a community, she argues, because the
people in the writing group have: (1) “developed a shared heightened
consciousness”; (2) engaged in intentional efforts to improve their
intellectual abilities; and (3) engaged in activities aimed at promoting
knowledge and awareness among other incarcerated people.295
Standing next to the influential, published memoirs are hundreds of
shorter writings published in anthologies,296 and online sources like
blogs,297 and collections of archived prison writing. The American
Prison Writing Archive (“APWA”) states its mission in similar terms to
the central claim of this Article: that first-person accounts of
imprisonment are essential to criminal justice reform, and that
“soliciting, preserving, digitizing and disseminating the work of
imprisoned people, prison workers and volunteers” will “ground
national debate on mass incarceration in the lived experience of those

293 See LoCi & Wittenberg University Writing Group, supra note 274, at 17
(describing “highlighting gaps in how prison is viewed and the reality of life in prison”
as one method of epistemic development for incarcerated people). The article generally
discusses how incarcerated people can (but do not always) develop epistemic virtues
that result in a “subversive lucidity” of carceral knowledge. The term “subversive
lucidity” derives from MEDINA, EPISTEMOLOGY OF RESISTANCE, supra note 141, at 44.
294 Nancy Arden McHugh, Epistemic Communities and Institutions, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 270, 275 (arguing that
communities rather than individuals produce knowledge). See generally LoCI &
Wittenberg University Writing Group, supra note 274, at 10 (reflecting the group’s
“position on the subversive lucidity that can be generated by people who are
incarcerated”).
295 The group explicitly endorses the idea that incarcerated people can and do
possess knowledge that is less accessible to people who have not been incarcerated.
Alluding to W.E.B. DuBois’ concept of “double consciousness,” and José Medina’s
concept of “meta-lucidity,” the LoCi writer’s note that they have lived both outside and
inside of prisons, and thus have insights gleaned from both settings that position them
as producers of knowledge about how sentencing policy and practice affects its subjects.
See McHugh, supra note 294, at 275-77.
296 See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 30 (providing an anthology of first-person essays
written by imprisoned people).
297 See, e.g., Case, supra note 5 (providing a collection of blog posts by an imprisoned
writer and poet).
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who know prisons best.”298 Epistemic clarity about prisons, the APWA
argues, requires reading multiple accounts written by the people inside
of the prisons.
New journalism methods have yielded additional ways for insider
perspectives on incarceration to reach public audiences. In the wake of
COVID-19 outbreaks in U.S. prisons and jails, journalists have
published podcasts with live interviews of incarcerated people
describing coronavirus issues in the prisons.299 And, although
newspapers published from prisons are in decline, new publishing
formats for reporting on life inside prisons are emerging.300 Websites
dedicated to criminal justice journalism publish prisoner reports. The
Marshall Project’s Life Inside Series, for example, publishes first-person
essays by prisoners, guards, volunteers, and others in the criminal
justice system.301 Essays from prisoners are personal and, while
idiosyncratic, illuminate aspects of imprisonment that may not
otherwise be obvious. One essay, for example, tells the story of a
prisoner laboring in the fields of Texas in what the writer experiences
as a “time warp.”302
Podcasts provide another format within which incarcerated voices are
reaching the public. Ear Hustle, a podcast from San Quentin, has
enjoyed national success.303 Aimed at offering a “nuanced view of
people living within the American prison system,” Ear Hustle episodes
address a variety of topics about prison life such as parenting from
298 History, Process, Mission, supra note 292. Other web-based repositories, like
PrisonWriters.org, allow for the collection of thousands of short works by incarcerated
people in order to “to give incarcerated people a voice, a chance to be heard and a
platform for telling the outside world what is really happening behind those bars.” About
Us, PRISON WRITERS, https://prisonwriters.com/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/4YVG-5RT5].
299 See, e.g., Outbreak at San Quentin, SNAP JUDGMENT (July 23, 2020),
https://snapjudgment.org/episode/outbreak-at-san-quentin/ [https://perma.cc/WR7U6A7W] (publishing first-hand accounts from incarcerated people within San Quentin
as they navigate the COVID-19 pandemic).
300 Organizations like the Prison Journalism Project, founded in 2020, help prisoners
develop as journalists and publish their articles online. PRISON JOURNALISM PROJECT,
https://prisonjournalismproject.org/about-pjp (last visited Dec. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
7W3H-8XLA].
301 See Life Inside, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/
tag/life-inside (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/H7FY-QY52].
302 Timothy D.V. Bazrowx, Fields of Blood: My Life as a Prison Laborer, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Jan. 24, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/01/24/
fields-of-blood-my-life-as-a-prison-laborer [https://perma.cc/RLX23-HF5U].
303 Bay area artist Nigel Poor partnered with formerly incarcerated co-producer
Earlonne Woods, and incarcerated co-founder, Antwan Williams, to create and produce
the show. See EAR HUSTLE, supra note 4.
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prison, dating in prison, personal style and grooming, and prisoner
perspectives on the politics of crime and punishment.304 As such, it is
possible for sentencing authorities to glean knowledge about prison-asexperienced from a wide range of first-person sources. Certainly, the
risk remains that people outside of prisons will generalize about prison
experiences from exposure to limited sources. At the same time, the
accessibility of digital forums in which to submit a short essay or to be
interviewed should permit a greater range of incarcerated voices to be
heard.
C. Variation in Prison Experiences
1.

Variation as an Epistemic Concern

As I discuss earlier, the experience of imprisonment varies depending
on the conditions of confinement,305 and the person experiencing the
confinement.306 This should come as no surprise. Daily life for everyone
is shaped by small variables, like the kindness of others, the quality of
the food one eats, and so forth. Prisons are societies in almost every
respect. Prison journalist and memoirist Walter Rideau described his
discovery that prison is not just a removal from society, but an entry
into a new society with the distinctive social elements of a city:

304 But San Quentin is not a maximum-security prison, and, while it addresses
serious topics of the pains of imprisonment, it keeps the listener removed from the
experience of the raw footage Whitney took from inside of a Florida prison. See
Ellenbogen, supra note 266.
305 Researcher Lori Sexton identifies “micro-level institutional environments” of
prisons that influence the harshness of prison-as-experienced. Sexton, Under the Penal
Gaze, supra note 40, at 23. For example, prisoners’ negative emotions associated with
imprisonment were mitigated when prisoners lived in cells circling a central dayroom
with regular furniture and had access to amenities like coffee makers and microwaves.
Id. at 21. Researchers have also documented institutional and era-based variety in
attitudes toward imprisonment. See generally CANDACE KRUTTSCHNITT & ROSEMARY
GARTNER, MARKING TIME IN THE GOLDEN STATE: WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT IN CALIFORNIA
(2005) (documenting the changes in penal policy in California between the 1960s and
1990s).
306 Sexton, Under the Penal Gaze, supra note 40, at 83-84. And, it is a sad truth that
certain carceral conditions may be better than the conditions available to someone
outside of prison. See, e.g., MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED
PRISONS 28-30 (1996) (noting a theme in prison memoirs of long-term incarceration
producing feelings of comfort and familiarity in the prison setting); CAROLYN SUFRIN,
JAILCARE: FINDING THE SAFETY NET FOR WOMEN BEHIND BARS 3 (2018) (documenting
stories of pregnant women who were unable to secure prenatal care anywhere but in
the San Francisco jail).
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Like almost everyone else, before I found out firsthand what
prison was like, I thought it was just a purgatory where
criminals were warehoused and punished before being returned
to society. I was surprised to learn that it was a world unto itself,
with its own peculiar culture, belief system, lifestyle, power
structure, economy, and currency.307
In other words, varied experiences and relationships can happen in all
populated, semi-stable societies, including in prisons.
Developing a non-ideal theory of the injustices of incarceration does
not require a monolithic description of injustice. Instead, the non-ideal
theory attends to accounts of experience in a “particularistic,
fallibilistic, and melioristic fashion.”308 The injustice theory laid out in
this Article seeks specifics; is open to correction; and strives to
ameliorate everyday injustices without over-reliance on imagined, ideal
states of justice.309 Because the line between what is considered unjust
and what is considered bad luck is a “political choice,”310 the line can
be moved by a better understanding of the harm. Understanding the
harms that befall others (in order to decide whether they should be
considered an injustice) is not easy. Shklar offers, “[i]f injustice is as
complex and as intractable as seems likely, a less rule-bound
phenomenology suggests itself as a better way of exploring the
matter.”311 It is the job of political theory to consider every aspect of
injustice as experienced at the individual, interpersonal, and
governmental levels.312 Multiplicity of voices is thus a strength, not a
weakness, when developing theories of injustice.
Variability has long been seen as complicating, yet enhancing
knowledge by scholars of feminist epistemology,313 intersectionality,314

307

RIDEAU, supra note 7, at 87.
MEDINA, supra note 141, at 13; see also id. at 12 (“We need a theory of injustice
more than a theory of justice.” (emphasis in original)).
309 See id. at 11-12.
310 SHKLAR, supra note 28, at 5 (“But we must recognize that the line of separation
between injustice and misfortune is a political choice, not a simple rule that can be
taken as a given.”).
311 Id. at 28.
312 Id. at 50.
313 See HELEN LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 215-16 (1990) (noting that
“contextual empiricism” describes how scientific knowledge can be partially structured
by social and cultural contexts yet nevertheless transcend relativism and pure
subjectivity).
314 See Ann C. McGinley & Frank R. Cooper, Identities Cubed: Perspectives on
Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326, 328-29 (2013) (describing
308
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and, now, epistemic injustice.315 Multiple sources produce a plurality,
but it functions as a mosaic.316 From this perspective, the goal is not to
identify a unified voice, but to encourage the friction caused when
“eccentric voices and perspectives are heard and can interact with
mainstream ones, [so] that the experiences and concerns of those who
live in darkness and silence do not remain lost and unattended.”317
An analogy can be made between engaging with the friction created
by differing views and what qualitative researchers call triangulation:
comparing multiple sources to find patterns, themes, and to establish
reliability.318 Attention to heterogeneous prison experiences, however,
need not be cast as a scientific project. Rather, it is an epistemic and
imaginative project designed to expand moral imagination through a
deeper understanding of the harms caused by incarceration.
Although I am trumpeting pluralistic virtues, I remain mindful of
Patricia Hill Collins’ caution against prioritizing subjective,
individualistic experience over understanding how social hierarchies
produce experiences in subordinated groups.319 Even though prison
experiences vary, incarcerated people speak about themes of harm and
degradation that flow directly from the shared experience of belonging
to a subordinated group largely at the mercy of the carceral apparatus.320
Prison’s cruelties should not be relegated to one of many idiosyncratic
punishment possibilities out of an excessive fear of generalization.321
Especially when incarcerated people work together to make their
multidimensionality theory using the metaphor of a Rubik’s cube, which suggests that
identity has multiple socially constructed variables in constant and related motion).
315 See José Medina, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: CounterMemory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerilla Pluralism, 12 FOUCAULT STUD. 9, 12 (2011)
(supporting “vibrant and feisty pluralism” as the hallmark of epistemic function).
316 See id.
317 Id. at 21. Mills calls this the creation of “experiential space.” CHARLES MILLS,
BLACKNESS VISIBLE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 27 (1998).
318 Nancy Carter, Denise Bryant-Lukosius, Alba DiCenso, Jennifer Blythe & Alan J.
Neville, The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research, 41 ONCOLOGY NURSING. F. 545,
545 (2014).
319 Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality and Epistemic Injustice, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, supra note 158, at 119 (“[T]he discourse on identity
politics that potentially empowers subordinated groups disappears within a linguistic
shift from collective identity to multiple subjectivities.”).
320 See, e.g., Dolovich, Cruelty, supra note 18, at 912-13 (describing vulnerability to
the prison administration as a generalized feature of incarceration).
321 There is, of course, a risk that, in attempting to identify themes in the experiences
of prisoners, sentencing authorities will unwittingly engage in epistemic injustice. This
risk always present when “speaking for others.” This concern highlights the importance
of direct participation of incarcerated people in sentencing decisions.
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experiences intelligible to outsiders, as in the First Five Grieving
Committee,322 their views can be seen as those of an intentional “plural
subject” articulating a unified perspective.323
2.

A Proposal for Dealing with Variability: Assume the Worst

While epistemic injustice theory welcomes it, variability in prison-asexperienced can nonetheless pose a problem for sentencing authorities
who wish to take prison’s cruelties into consideration in sentencing
policy and decisions. Given that prison conditions vary based on dayto-day decisions of prison officials, sentencing authorities may argue
that they have insufficient general knowledge about prison’s cruelties to
consider them as part of sentencing policy and practice. Moreover, a
change in the prison administration could dramatically change prison
conditions in the future. The variability of prison experiences among
prisons, prison units, and over time makes it difficult to consider
prison-as-experienced in sentencing decisions.
One possible solution is for lawmakers setting punishments and
judges setting sentences to inform themselves about the experiences of
prisoners in the prisons in their jurisdiction and then assume that the
worst conditions known will occur. This practice of assuming the worst
accords with the nonideal theory of injustice. The sentencing authority
accepts that injustice may be the norm rather than an exception, and
that, as Shklar states, “[m]ost injustices occur continuously within the
framework of an established polity with an operative system of law, in
normal times.”324 No other approach will ensure that the punishmentas-experienced fits its intended goals and is no harsher than intended.
Generalizations about prison’s cruelties can be applied at sentencing in
spite of the fact that prison conditions may sometimes be better than
expected, as explained below.
Given that a judge cannot control what prison conditions the
defendant will experience, the sentence should take into account the
worst known conditions that could befall any person sentenced to
prison in their jurisdiction.325 Sentencing judges have almost no
authority over the prisons where defendants will be placed or their
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See Medina, Agential Epistemic Injustice, supra note 186, at 9-10; supra Part III.B.1.
See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 18 (1992).
324 SHKLAR, supra note 28, at 19.
325 My argument is based on the court’s inability to control for the defendant’s prison
experience through rulings made at sentencing. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238 (1983) (holding prison administrators may order for prisoner to be transferred to
other prisons without implicating the prisoner’s due process rights).
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conditions of confinement.326 Legislators have more control through
funding and oversight of prisons, but they have limited ability to
intervene in the day-to-day decisions of the prison administration.327
With no control over the sentence after administered, sentencing policy
and practice should err on the side of the defendant, just as criminal law
errs on the side of the defendant in its other principles, such as the
principle of lenity.328 Assuming the worst prison experience may mean
that the defendant is punished less if the prison is better than expected,
but it protects against the defendant being punished more than
intended.
Some may argue that the most sensible place to consider prison’s
cruelties is in prison reform, through legislation and litigation. As I
discussed in Part I, an exclusive focus on prison reform underestimates
centuries of failed prison reform and misses the upstream opportunity
to consider prison’s cruelties at sentencing.329 Prison reform has been
carried out for centuries and yet, as Martin tells us, prisons are still
fundamentally cruel and brutal.330 It is precisely because sentencing
courts cannot control for prison conditions that they should factor the
likely prison experience into their sentencing calculations,
understanding that it is, in general, characterized by harshness that is
beyond the current imagination of many judges. The sentence-asexperienced will often otherwise be much more punitive and
destructive than intended by the more formulistic calculation at
sentencing.
CONCLUSION
I began with the puzzle of why available information about the
cruelties of prison-as-experienced exists but is not applied in any sort
of systematic way by legislatures setting punishments for crimes or by

326 See FERGUSON, INFERNO, supra note 26, at 58 (citing Foucault’s discussion of the
“punishment gap” between sentencing and the actual sentence meted out by the prison
administration).
327 Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 331-32 (2009)
(characterizing prison life as governed by administrative regulations “formulated
outside of public view”).
328 For example, ambiguities in statutes are resolved in favor of the accused. See
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 940-41
(2004) (rejecting notice and legislative supremacy as complete justifications for the rule
of lenity, and arguing for a broader lenity rule justified as a method of reining in
tendencies to over criminalize conduct).
329 See supra Part I.
330 Stay Tuned: Behind Barrs (with Steve Martin, Prison Reformer), supra note 20.
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judges imposing sentences. In this Article, I have explored the puzzle
using the philosophical framework of epistemic injustice and offered
some ways in which the qualitative experience of imprisonment might
be known and then considered in sentencing policy and practice. The
very existence of sources like the American Prison Writing Archive and
the Marshall Project’s Life Inside suggest growing interest in obtaining
and perhaps deploying a more accurate and empathetic understanding
of what we are doing when we sentence people to prison.331 Yet,
disbelief, disinterest, and contempt for prisoners present obstacles to
understanding prison’s cruelties, and thus, distort punishment
decisions.
Epistemic injustice theory offers an overarching framework that
demonstrates how ignorance and lack of interest (or active hostility)
can be mutually reinforcing, shedding light on how prison-asexperienced can slip to the background of seeming irrelevance to
sentencing decisions. Moreover, epistemic injustice theory provides a
framework for thinking about the normative questions — ethical and
epistemological — about sentencing policy and practice.
First-person participation in knowledge creation is an ethical and an
epistemological responsibility.332 It is ethical because it acknowledges
the speaker’s status as a person who can provide information.333 It is
epistemic because it produces unique and necessary knowledge.
Prisoners are a social group with first-hand experience of the pains of
imprisonment. They are an invaluable source of information about what
prison is like, offering empirical information in the sense that they offer
information based on lived experience.334
Prisoner voices are essential to assessing the punishment of
imprisonment. Prison surely means different things to senators, judges,
and incarcerated people. As a result, it is important to begin to build
some sort of collective idea about prison that is grounded in prison-asexperienced. If legal and policy actors responsible for sentencing
decisions do not have a robust sense of prison-as-experienced,
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See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.A.
333 See FRICKER, supra note 25, at 44-47.
334 While some empiricists see knowledge as a product of both the senses and innate
ideas, others see all knowledge, including ideas that appear to us to be neutral principles
generated internally as the product of sensory experience. See, e.g., DAVID HUME,
ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 12-13 (1748) (proposing that causes and
effects are only knowable by experience, not by reason); WILLIAM JAMES, ESSAYS IN
RADICAL EMPIRICISM 57-58 (1912) (describing knowledge as a purely experiential
process).
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sentencing decisions will continue to be unmoored from ethical
considerations of the actual harms of incarceration.
While I support efforts to create better theories of sentencing, and
have called for just that in another article,335 I am now persuaded that
efforts to find a just theory of sentencing are premature. If sentencing
as currently practiced is systemically unjust, the first step is to articulate
what makes the current system of imprisonment unjust, cataloging the
depth and scope of the harms of incarceration. As I discussed in Part I,
Shklar’s theory of injustice posits that, without a granular study of the
harms people experience, we will be unable to understand injustice.
Instead, we will treat injustice as discrete moments of departure from
the norm of justice, and thus, conflate injustice with bad luck.336
Prison’s cruelties, now cast as incidental to punishment decisions,
should be catalogued and considered as injustices that are endemic to
the practice of incarceration. Only after this task can we fairly evaluate
incarceration as a practice and its theoretical justifications as a method
of punishment.
Learning from incarcerated people is difficult because it requires both
virtuous listening and removing the practical barriers to prisoner
speech. It remains to be seen whether lawmakers and judges will
become more virtuous listeners despite structural and unconscious
mechanisms that silence incarcerated people. Responsible, unbiased
listening is difficult. As such, opportunities must be created for
incarcerated people to engage in the process of political and legal
decisions about punishment.

335 M. Eve Hanan, Incapacitating Errors: Sentencing and the Science of Change, 97
DENV. L. REV. 151, 203 (2019).
336 SHKLAR, supra note 28, at 17 (“This normal model of justice does not ignore
injustice but it does tend to reduce it to a prelude to or a rejection and breakdown of
justice, as if injustice were a surprising abnormality.”); see also FRICKER, supra note 25,
at 39 (arguing that “testimonial injustice is a normal part of discursive life”).

